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Abstract 
 
Many Chinese State Owned Enterprises are facing problems of over-capacity and inefficient 
productivity. These problems have contributed to the slowdown of Chinese economic growth. 
Some people believe that this is the time for SOEs to improve their productivity and financial 
system in order to be more efficient to support future Chinese economic growth. However, the 
central government has decided to not reform the current SOE system and continue funding 
SOEs in order to let them play an important role in the "Belt and Road Initiative." Many people 
think that this is a way to vindicate SOEs, or to excuse the current domestic economic problems 
that SOEs created in China. The first chapter identifies possible reasons for the recent downturn 
in China’s economic growth and explores its relationship to the SOE system. Chapter 2 reviews 
the role that China’s SOEs play in the Belt and Road Initiative, whether or not they are capable 
of maintaining their current form in this role, and what kind of difficult challenges they might 
face in this project. The SOEs’ potential for success or failure in this initiative is predicted. 
Chapter 3 concludes whether or not SOEs’ participation in the Belt and Road Initiative is worth 
the cost to the future of Chinese economy. 
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Chapter 1 - The slowdown of Chinese economic growth and its relationship to the SOE model 
 
 The Chinese economy has maintained rapid economic growth since 1978. Its annual growth has 
reached up to 9.8% during the past 20 years, which was considered one of the highest GDP 
growth rates around the world.  Since 2011, however, China's economic growth has slowed, 
decreasing from 10.6% in 2010 to 9.5% in 2011 and recently in 2016, the growth rate declined to 
6.7%, the lowest point since 1990, leading many to worry about the Chinese economic future and 
wonder why growth has slowed after 40 successive years of high growth. Some scholars think 
that the recent 5-year economic downturn was because China’s “investment-driven” economic 
strategy has lost its advantage.
1
 This strategy has been adopted and emphasized by the Chinese 
government for more than 35 years. 
The ratio of a fixed-asset investment- to-GDP has been close to 50 percent in recent years. Many 
large companies mainly concentrate in industries providing production factors that are closely 
related to fixed-asset investment: finance, energy, commodities including coal, copper, steel and 
aluminum.
2
 Investment stoked China’s appetite for these production factors, making it a sponge 
for raw materials all over the world.
3
 The Chinese government tightly controls these markets and 
does not give private companies many opportunities, the result of which is largely bloated and 
inefficient giant companies.
4
 
                                                 
1
 Liu Guanchao,” Causes of Inadequate Consumption in China: a Literature Review,” Modern Economic Science; Vol. 
32 No. 6 (Nov. 2010). 
2
 Qiao Liu, Corporate China 2.0: The Great Shake Up (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016), 8. 
3
 Ibid. 
4
 Ibid. 
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The following table from Qiao Liu's recent book "Corporate China 2.0: The Great Shakeup” 
shows a comparison of the ten largest listed companies in the US stock market and China's A-
share market.
5
  
Table 1 Top 10 listed companies in the USA and China’s A-share market
6
 
 
On the Chinese side, many of them are either commercial banks or insurance companies, such as 
ICBC, Bank of China, Agricultural Bank of China Life Insurance and so on. In contrast, the U.S. 
side shows more diversity, such as Exxon Mobil in energy, Johnson and Johnson in consumer 
goods and Google, Apple, Microsoft & Facebook in the internet/technology field. Most of the 
largest Chinese top companies in A-share stock market are from the sectors providing 
investments, indicating a highly concentrated financial sector that controls state-led investment. 
“The Big Four” state-owned commercial banks are on the list, each with its own role and 
specialization to provide investments for Chinese economy: Industrial and Commercial Bank of 
China (ICBC) is the largest lender for the Chinese industry.
7 
The amount of loans, both on and 
off balance sheet, go mostly to heavy industries such as steel, iron, aluminum, and cement. China 
Construction Bank (CCB), the country's second-largest lender, has reported a big rise in the size 
                                                 
5
 Ibid. 
6
 Ibid. 
7
 Reuters Staff, "China's ICBC signs $4 billion debt swap with Shandong Steel: Xinhua," Reuters, May 25, 2017. 
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of loans for infrastructure projects, which the government has identified as a key focus to drive 
economic growth.
8
 From 2010 to 2015, more than 40 percent of the bank’s annual loans for 
public affairs was allocated to infrastructure construction.
9
 The Bank of China (BOC) fully 
leveraged its strength in regional economic development by financing domestic regional 
economic developments such as the Belt and Road initiative, the Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei regional 
development and the Yangtze River Economic Belt. The Agricultural Bank of China (ABC) 
supports the enterprises leading agricultural modernization and new agricultural business entities 
to enhance their services to large-scale customers in the county areas.
10
 Loans for the county 
areas, in response to the government projects to support infrastructure, energy, transportation and 
to rebuild shanty areas, increased by RMB 136,000 million.
11
 
The functions of these Big Four state-owned commercial Banks are mostly focusing on real-
economic developments; especially heavy industries, energy, constructions and urban-rural 
infrastructures, which are extremely capital and energy-intensive.
12
 The central government 
directly controls these four state-owned banks. They are at the center of a state-led growth plan 
that focuses on high capital investment. 
1. Heavy capital-intensive investment, low Total Factor Productivity 
Total Factor Productivity (TFP) growth is a major source of economic growth; and it determined 
by how efficiently and intensely the inputs are utilized in production.
13
 Thus, an understanding of 
how and why productivity measures change is of great interest to economists and 
                                                 
8
 Xiang Bo, "China Construction Bank's infrastructure loans surge," Xinhua News, March 27, 2015. 
9
 Xin Hua, "China Construction Bank's infrastructure loans surge," China Daily, August 28, 2015. 
10
 Agricultural Bank of China, Annual Report 2014, 15, 2015, accessed November 21, 2017. 
http://www.abchina.com/en/AboutUs/annual-report/201603/P020160405603491905726.pdf  
11
 Agricultural Bank, 21. 
12
 Barry Naughton, The Chinese Economy: Transitions and Growth (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 2007), 330. 
13
 Comin, Diego (2008) ―Total factor productivity, The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics. Second Edition, eds. 
Steven N. Durlauf and Lawrence E. Blume, Palgrave Macmillan.  
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policymakers.
14
 China’s average TFP during the period from 1979-2014 was very low, only 
9.87% toward the GDP. This low TFP rate reveals that the rest of the 90.13% of the growth has 
required a large investment to provide inputs such as labor and raw materials.
15
Due to a low TFP 
rate, a 10% GDP growth would require a 30% ratio of fixed investment to GDP.
16
  Furthermore, 
the scenario of low productivity with large investments causes low ROIC rates (Return-On-
Investment Capital rate) in Chinese industrial enterprises. Between 1998–2012, the average 
ROIC (Return-On-Investment Capital rate) of China’s large firms was only 3 percent.17 The 
example of one of the largest Chinese steel enterprises, the China Group, is only around 3.5% in 
recent years.
18
 Also, the largest Chinese cement group, Shanshui Cement Corp is even worse 
than China Steel Corp, which is -3.54%.
19 
1.1 The low level of investment efficiency 
In the Fig. 1 below, Liu shows that the pile-up of local government debts has a lot to do with a 
low level of investment efficiency at the local government level. Particularly, he uses the debt-to-
fiscal revenue ratio to measure the leverage ratio of a certain province or province-equivalent 
municipal city (horizontal axis); he uses the local GDP-to-local capital stock ratio to measure 
investment efficiency. Here, local capital stock is calculated as the sum of the previous 20 years’ 
fixed-asset investments depreciated at an annual rate of 5 percent. Clearly, at the provincial level, 
                                                 
14
 Bauer, P.W. (1990). “Decomposing TFP Growth in the Presence of Cost Inefficiency, No constant Returns to 
Scale, and Technological Progress.” Journal of Productivity Analysis 1, 287–299. 
15
 Wu Xianman and Jiang Zhaoyi, “A Research on Financial Support Policy about the Structural Reform in the Supply 
Side in Wuhan” Nankai University Magazine Vol. 5 No. 7 (2016). 
16
 Ibid. 
17
 Qiao Liu, "Does ROIC Apply to Corporate China?," Springer Link, last modified December 25, 2016, accessed 
November 22, 2017, https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1057/978-1-137-55089-7_3#citeas  
18
 China Steel Corp (OTCPK:CISEY) ROIC %: 2.82% (As of Sep. 2017)," 
https://www.gurufocus.com/term/ROIC/CISEY/ROIC-/China-Steel-Corp, last modified September 9, 2017. 
19
 "Asia Cement Corp (1102.TW)," Reuters, accessed November 22, 2017, 
https://www.reuters.com/finance/stocks/1102.TW/key-developments  
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there is a significantly negative correlation between local investment efficiency and local 
government debt.
20
 
 
Figure 1. Local investment efficiency versus local government debts
21 
1.2 Actual GDP declines as financial investment increases 
By looking at the Figure 2 of the variable changes between the value added in finance/GDP vs 
real GDP growth, people could see that on the horizontal axis, the increased financing income 
over GDP during 2005-2016, reveals how finance has become increasingly more important in 
China. Vertically, the real GDP growth rate from 2005 to 2016, drops over time as finance 
income/ GDP increases, which is inversely related. It indicates that as the finance sector becomes 
more important, the real GDP actually starts to decline. Especially when its GDP growth dropped 
down to 6.7% in 2016, China’s financing investment actually increased to almost 0.1 of GDP. 
This number is actually the largest it has been in 20 years. 
                                                 
20
 Liu, 165-166. 
21
 Liu, 165. 
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 Figure 2. Value added in Finance/GDP vs. Actual GDP Growth, 2005-201622 
China’s economy mostly relies on bank lending. (Table 1, page 2) As noted earlier, the top giant 
commercial banks on the list are largely bloated and inefficient, which has resulted in low level 
investment efficiency (e.g. investment in energy, raw materials, construction, heavy industries 
etc.).
23
  This graph from a finance perspective has shown that the current investment-driven 
economic model, which has been used to supported Chinese fast economic growth in the past 35 
years, cannot be sustained anymore.
24
 
1.3 Capital productivity drops as capital-labor ratio and capital stock increase 
Table 2 shows, a comparison of the growth in factor productivity and capital ratios between the 
periods of 1978-1995 and 1995-2005. It reveals that the rates of capital productivity of the period 
of 1995-2005 had declined to -2.78 from 0.84. However, at the same time, its growth in capital 
stock and capital-labor ratio increased substantially from 9.19 to 12.38 and 5.39 to 9.52.
25
 It 
                                                 
22
 Ibid. 
23
 Liu, 9. 
24
 2017 Guanghua NY Forum: The Future of Corporate China, 2017 video file, posted Jun 28., 2017 accessed, Nov. 
19, 2017, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=edV78OWIgaI  
25
 Jinghai Zhang, Arne Bigsten, and Angang Hu. “Can China’s Growth Be Sustained? A Productivity Perspective.” 
World Development 37, no. 4 (08 7, 2008): 874-88.  
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resulted in a negative return on declined capital productivity while capital stocks and capital-
labor ratio increased. 
 
Table 2 Growth in factor productivity and capital labor ratios (1978-2005)
26 
2. Inefficiencies cause private sector, labor-intensive manufacturing to lose their advantage  
Compared to the size of state sector, which accounts for more than 40 percent of total GDP and 
about 20 percent of China’s total employment,27 the private sector accounts for almost 60 percent 
of total GDP and provides over 80 percent of jobs.
28
 China’s private sector produces almost half 
of the world's shoes and clothes as well as household gadgets, toys, appliances, furniture, 
Christmas ornaments, sunglasses and other consumables.
29
 Low-end, labor-intensive 
manufacturing makes China the largest manufacturer in the world. The competitive advantage of 
cheap labor is the engine of huge manufacturing that boosts living standards by doubling the 
country's GDP per capita over the last decade.
30  
The low salary of workers in the manufacturing 
industries serves to reduce enterprises’ production costs, which provides them a price advantage 
among international market competition.
 
                                                 
26
 Ibid. 
27
 This information is derived from the State Department’s Office of Investment Affairs’ Investment Climate 
Statement. Any questions on the ICS can be directed to EB-ICS-DL@state.gov, ed., “China - 7-State Owned 
Enterprises,” export. gov, last modified July 25, 2017, accessed December 9, 2017. 
https://www.export.gov/article?id=China-State-Owned-Enterprises  
28
 Eswar Prasad, “The path to sustainable growth in China,” Brookings Institute, last modified April 22, 2015, 
accessed December 9, 2017. 
29
Jeffrey Hays “Cheap labor industries in China and the end of Cheap Labor in China,” facts and details, accessed 
November 22, 2017. 
30
 Karel Eloot, Alan Huang, and Martin Lehnich, “A new era for manufacturing in China,” McKinsey & Company 
Operation, last modified June 2013, accessed November 22, 2017.  
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Over the past 10 years, however, a continued decline in China’s workforce drove up wages faster 
than productivity gains, thus potentially slowing the growth rate of real GDP. China’s labor costs 
in the urban manufacturing sector reached ¥31,000 ($4,579) per employee per year in 2010, 
more than doubling from just ¥12,700 ($1,534) in 2003. China’s costs are growing at a faster rate 
than many other countries with low overall manufacturing costs.
31
 China’s manufacturing 
competitive advantages are lost to India, Bangladesh, Vietnam and Cambodia, which have even 
cheaper labor.
32
 The current average hourly wages for Chinese workers hit $3.60 last year, more 
than five times the hourly manufacturing wage in India, and is more on par with countries such 
as Portugal and South Africa.
33
 As economic growth and scale expanded rapidly in recent 10 
years in China, so did worker wages. Increased wages translated to higher costs and lower profits 
for factories and has put China in an inferior competitive position. 
Chinese exports have declined since 2009. The export rate has dropped to 7.7 percent in 2016 
which is the lowest point in the past 7 years.
34
 China’s textile export to the European Union 
reached $44.86 billion, falling by 10.6 percent year-on-year, the export to Japan fell 12 percent 
to $18.8 billion, and the export to Asian countries hit $29.03 billion, slipping 1.7 percent, 
according to customs data.
35
 In addition, the export value of footwear in the first eight months of 
this year declined by 3.5% totaling $34.713 million compared to similar period in 2014 
(compares to $35.957 million).
36
 While Chinese exports have declined, at the same time, 
                                                 
31
 Simon Zhang, “China’s Rising Costs,” China Business Review, last modified July 1, 2012. 
32
 R.A. “The end of cheap Chinese labor?" The Economist, last modified July 18, 2010, accessed Nov. 22, 2017. 
33
 Sophia Yuan, “Made in China' isn't so cheap anymore, and that could spell headache for Beijing,” CNBC News, 
last modified February 27, 2017, accessed November 22, 2017.  
34
 Kimberly Amadeo, “China's Economy Facts and Effect on the U.S. Economy,” The Balance, last modified October 
26, 2017, accessed November 22, 2017, accessed November 22, 2017. 
35
 Wenqian Zhu, “China's textile exports decline in 2015,” China Daily, last modified Jan. 14, 2016, accessed Nov. 
22, 2017. 
36
 Elias Glenn and Sue-Lin Wong, “China posts worst export fall since 2009 as fears of U.S. trade war loom,” 
Reuters, last modified January 13, 2017, accessed November 22, 2017. 
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Bangladesh exports inched up 10 percent to 34.24 percent.
37
 Thailand increased 0.5 percent, 
Cambodia increased nearly 17 percent and Vietnam increased nearly 19.8 percent.
38
 
2.1 Negative marginal productivity while labor-capital force increased 
According to the GDP formula below, GDP gross as an output which is through the inputs of the 
increasing either the amount of labor or the capital.  
GDP=AF (capital, labor) or AF(K,L),  where Y is GDP,K is capital and L=labor 
However, due to the law of diminishing marginal productivity, Marginal productivity refers to 
the additional output gained by adding one unit of factor of production when other factors are 
held constant, and it gradually decreases as the amount of that factor increases.  We have note 
that when the labor-capital factor is growing, however; the TFP (AF) is declining. 
Recent statistics show that China’s TFP has been declining, while manufacturing production has 
been dominated by labor-intensive production techniques (Wu, Ma, and Guo 2014). TFP grew at 
an average annual rate of only 3.4% from 2012 to 2016, compared with 6.0% average growth 
over the previous five years, 2007-2011.
39
 A shortage of skilled labor supply serves as a major 
bottleneck for productivity improvement and economic transformation in China.
40
 
Paul Krugman has mentioned other important factors of TFP for economic growth besides large 
increases of labor-intensive inputs. In an example he gave, the former Soviet Union’s 
achievement to improve total labor productivity was to take the advantage of the power of the 
                                                 
37
 Reuters Staff, ed., “Bangladesh exports rise 12.7 pct in December on higher garment sales,” Reuters, last 
modified September 28, 2017, accessed December 6, 2017. 
38
 Kang Sothear, “Overall Export Values Rise; Garments Slow,” The Cambodia Daily, last modified February 4, 2016, 
accessed December 6, 2017. 
39
 Dandan Zhang, Xin Li, and Jinjin Xue, “Education Inequality between Rural and Urban Areas of the People’s 
Republic of China, Migrants’ Children Education, and Some Implications,” Asian Development Review 32, no. 01 
(2015): 197. 
40
 Ibid. 
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central government to have a mobilization to "move millions of workers from cities, pushed 
millions of women into the labor force and millions of men into longer hours, pursued massive 
programs of education, and above all plowed an ever-growing proportion of the country's 
industrial output back into the construction of new factories.
41
 However, this extreme strong 
labor-intensive mobilization was eventually slowed down due to the lack of technological capital 
productivity support and skilled labor force when its marginal productivity refers to the 
additional output gained by adding additional workers held at an increasing rate, and it gradually 
decreases as the amount of labor force increases. 
By the contrast, Krugman also described the success of Singaporean economic model during 
1966-1990, which also adopted a similar strategy of mobilization as Soviet Union did, and its 
employed share of the population surged from 27-51 percent.
42
 However, unlike Russia, 
Singaporean government also realized that the importance of boosting its capital stock as well as 
technology & labor productivity. The government did a large investment physical capital: 
investment as a share of output rose from 11 to more than 40 percent.
43
 Moreover, a large 
education investment in Singapore also improved the quality of labor force which became more 
skilled and technically knowledgeable. The education standards have changed dramatically from 
1966 when there were no more than half the workers with formal education at all and by 1990 
two-thirds had completed secondary education.  It improved economic efficiency and elevated 
the low-end labor-intensive workforce to a high-end manufacturing level. As a consequence, 
Singapore avoided the stagnation of diminishing return unlike the Soviet Union, which boosted 
productivity only through putting with labor & capital force. 
                                                 
41
 Paul Krugman, “The Myth of Asia's Miracle,” Foreign Affairs 73, no. 6 (November/December 1994): 69. 
42
 Krugman, "The Myth," 70. 
43
 Ibid, 71. 
11 
 
 
 
Looking back to China, its manufacturing sector wages have risen rapidly and its surplus labor 
has diminished. As a result, China's economy now faces extraordinary pressure to upgrade its 
industrial structure and to enter new and more capital and knowledge-intensive industries to 
maintain dynamic growth.
44
 As China undergoes industrial upgrading to more sophisticated 
product markets, it will leave market space for other developing countries to enter into more 
labor-intensive industries.
45
 However, most of China's private manufacturing factories still lag 
behind in human-capital and technological developments. The manufacturing sector lacks 
sufficient investment in R&D, and cultivating technological and innovative talents, not to 
mention independent brands, and supply and marketing networks.
46
  
2.2 State financial policy obstructs private sector’s productivity 
In China, financial lending policies have a very negative effect on private firms.
47
 The policies 
are biased toward the state sector leaving private companies with many difficulties accessing 
financing. The resulting financial repression has profound effects on the private sector’s ability 
to thrive.
48
 While large state-owned enterprises and private firms take up much of bank credit 
and are the main issuers of corporate bonds and equity placements, smaller firms, especially 
those in the private sector, face significant constraints in accessing capital markets.
49
 The big 
four banks have lending practices and a regulatory framework that favor the state owned 
enterprises over the private firms.
50
 
                                                 
44
 Lin, J. and Treichel, V. (2012) Learning from China’s Rise to Escape the Middle-Income Trap. A new structural 
economics approach to Latin America. Policy Research Working Paper No. 6165. Washington, DC: World Bank 1. 
45
 Ibid. 
46
 Hangyan Zhang, "How to revive the manufacturing sector?" China Daily, last modified December 20, 2016. 
accessed November 22, 2017, http://usa.chinadaily.com.cn/opinion/2016-12/20/content_27716295.htm  
47
 Jahangir Aziz and Cui Li, "Explaining China’s Low Consumption: The Neglected Role of Household Income," 2007 
International Monetary Fund 07, no. 181 (July 2007): 4. 
48
 Liu, Corporate China 2.0: The Great Shake Up 92. 
49
 Aziz and Li, "Explaining China’s," 9. 
50
 Ibid. 
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As a result, the lack of state financial subsidies makes the private sectors have to save their own 
money to promote their businesses, which has hindered their technical evolution and growth in 
the global marketplace. Moreover, enterprise investment relied more on self-retained earnings 
and saving costs of enterprises is the only way for private sectors to stay profitable.
51
  
3. Low domestic consumption is part of economic downturn 
Despite China’s remarkably high growth during 2000-2010, the share of consumption in total 
expenditure has been very low.
52
 As a proportion of GDP, private consumption has fallen from 
49% in 1990, to 45% in 2000, to 29% in 2011.
53
 The share of household consumption in GNP, 
which has fallen to below 40 percent in 2005, despite the remarkable pace of sustained high 
economic growth.
54
 
Lardy (2008) measures the implicit tax that households are forced to pay because of the 
suppressed interest rate policies and calculated the implicit tax imposed on households by the 
decline in real rates of return on savings deposits.
55
 He cites an example of the first quarter of 
2008 when households received the same real rate of interest on their net Renminbi-denominated 
savings deposits as in 2002.
56
 Household deposits at the end of the first quarter of 2008 stood at 
RMB 19.1 trillion while household borrowing stood at RMB 5.3 trillion, making their net 
deposits RMB 13.8 trillion.
57
 The estimated implicit tax on these deposits is RMB 255 billion 
                                                 
51
 Dennis Tao Yang, Junsen Zhang, and Shaojie Zhou, “Why Are Saving Rates So High in China?,” Forschungsinstitut 
zur Zukunft der Arbeit Institute for the Study of Labor, no. 5465 (January/February 2011): 11-12. 
52
 Arslan Razmi, "Is the Chinese Investment- and Export-Led Growth Model Sustainable? Some Rising Concerns,” 
Department of Economics – University of Massachusetts Amherst, 2008, 4. 
53
 Frank Van Lerven, "Money Creation: explaining what's happening In China?" Positive Money, Sept. 1, 2015. 
54
 Aziz and Li, “Explaining China’s,” 9. 
55
 Lardy, Nicholas. “Financial Repression in China.” Peterson Institute for International Economics. Policy Brief. 
September 2008, 2.  
56
 Ibid. 
57
 Ibid. 
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($36 billion), the equivalent of 4.1 percent of GDP, in the first quarter of 2008.
58
 This implicit 
tax is more than three times the proceeds from the only tax imposed directly on households—the 
personal income tax.
59
 
Moreover, Bai, et al. (2001) and Dennis Tao Yang, Junsen Zhang, and Shaojie Zhou (2009) also 
argue that a combination of suppressed interest rates and wages, strict capital controls, low land 
rentals and state control of the banking system allows the government to increase its net revenue 
by reducing interest expenses. 
These repressive financial policies in turn have played a significant role in promoting the 
propensity of Chinese households to save.
60
 Chinese household savings have risen from 16% of 
GDP in 2000 to 23% of GDP in 2008.
61
 The rise in household savings is the result of two 
competing influences.
62
 From 1992 to 2008 there was a 10 percentage point decline in the 
household income share of GDP and a 10 percent point increase in the average propensity to 
save from household disposable income.
63
 Together, these two trends have led to the marked 
decline in household consumption from 55% of GDP two decades ago to 33% in 2009.
64
 
Zhuliang James Zhang (2011) notes that the root of the savings propensity has been hotly 
debated in the literature with suggested causes including income uncertainties engendered by the 
transition to the market economy, limited availability of instruments to borrow against future 
incomes to finance purchases, lack of international portfolio diversification, a severely lacking 
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and under-funded social safety net, and an aging society.
65
 Of these, recent literature has pointed 
to future income uncertainty due to suppressed incomes and the lack of a viable social safety net 
as the two core causes for high precautionary saving.
66
 
To prove the idea of the phenomenon of “investment/consumption imbalance”, a clear way is to 
look at the traditional formula for GDP, which is as follows: 
Y=C+I+G+NX 
where Consumption (C) represents private-consumption expenditures by households and 
nonprofit organizations, Investment (I) refers to business expenditures by businesses and real 
estate purchases by citizens, Government Consumption (G) denotes investment and expenditures 
on public goods and services by the government, and Net Exports (NX) represents a nation’s 
exports minus its imports. 
Investment (I) - The fixed capital investment in China 
Industries and manufacturing: Since the fixed-asset investment holds a key role in the economic 
growth and performance of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), and fixed capital formation 
has taken up roughly one third of gross domestic product (GDP) and kept a double digit growth 
on average, albeit with remarkably volatile dynamics.
67
 
Many industrial sectors, including steel and chemical products, private enterprises witnessed 
rapid expansion. From 2003-2010, the share of heavy industry in total industrial output increased 
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from 55 percent in 2002 to 67 percent in 2010.
68
At the same time, manufacturing investment 
made up 16 percent of total investment.
69
 
However, the massive investments in these sectors are reaching the point of diminishing returns. 
Real Estate: There is extremely high and excessive investment in real estate. Real estate has been 
a key engine of China’s rapid growth in the past decades. From 2002-2017, house prices more 
than doubled and in some big cities in the eastern areas, such as Shanghai, Beijing, Nanjing and 
Hangzhou, prices more than tripled. By 2005, the real estate bubble became noticeable, was not 
controlled, and further expanded into the so-called “second-front cities”.70 The results indicate 
that the bubble is about 25 percent of the equilibrium value implied by the fundamentals at the 
end of 2009. The bubble is particularly huge in the cities in the southeast coastal areas and 
special economic zones.
71
 
Distortions render China’s property market susceptible to both price misalignment and 
overbuilding. On the supply side, the market is distorted by local governments’ control over land 
supply and their reliance on land sales to finance spending. On the demand side, the market is 
prone to overvaluation—housing is attractive as an investment instrument given a history of 
robust capital gains, high savings, low real deposit interest rates, a lack of alternative financial 
assets, as well as capital account restrictions.
72
 When many households face a policy regime of 
financial repression with implicit taxes and low real rates of return on their savings deposits, 
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purchasing real estate might be the only stable way for people to invest their money to avoid its 
low rate saving through financial repression.
73
 
Government Consumption (G): 
Government budgetary consumption is still used as a major fiscal policy tool and this has 
enabled the State to underwrite enormous consumption in infrastructure, housing, new cities, 
state-owned enterprises (SOEs), space programs, national defense and the like. 
However, this strategy has caused a low-multiplier effect, which did not put enough government 
consumption for social welfare payments and many economists argue that this has slowed the 
growth of a consumer economy. The lack of government investment for social welfare 
development depresses domestic household consumption. 
For example, Chinese government spending is only around 3 percent of GDP on health and 
education, a rate that is one of the lowest in the world. The low government spending in these 
areas adds additional financial burdens to Chinese households.
74 
Through looking at the government’s disposable income, which is mainly from properties, taxes 
on all production, income taxes, and social insurance revenue but minus labor compensations, it 
has risen from 1.608 trillion RMB in 1999 to 6.308 trillion RMB in 2007
75
due to increased tax 
revenue with lower social welfare spending. Among the 1.081 trillion RMB of social insurance 
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fees in 2007, it only spent 1.028 trillion RMB on social welfare payments, social insurance 
provisions, and other transfers.
76 
High investments diverted from social welfare causes resulted in lower social welfare 
development and dampened people's outlook into an uncertain future. Therefore, to keep the 
current household income favorable in the face of such uncertainty, they save a lot.  
Prasad (2010) found that over half of the increase in China’s urban households’ savings rate can 
be traced to the main causes mentioned above: the rising income uncertainty of future income 
and pension reforms resulting in a reduced social safety net.
77
 Thus, households have responded 
to increased future income uncertainty by saving more in order to adjust their buffer stock of 
savings to the riskier environment,
78
 and it has caused a huge decline of household consumption 
in China. 
4. Fiscal policies to stimulate economic growth 
The Chinese government had long proposed policy plans to stimulate economic growth, such as 
the "Twelfth Five-year Plan," (Implemented by the government from 2011 to 2015). It 
implemented several anti-cyclical macro-fiscal stimulus policies to enhance the economic growth 
potential through promoting social consumption, thus adjusting the economic structural 
imbalance.
79
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4.1 Consumption-Driven Economic Growth  
A number of key goals in the 12th FYP were directed at moving the economy away from 
investment-driven and export-led growth, raising domestic consumption, and narrowing income 
inequality.
80
  These goals included: 
1. 7 percent annual GDP growth81 
2. 4 percent increase of the service sector as a percentage of GDP by 2015.82 
3. An increase in annual urban disposable income to >26,810 Renminbi (RMB) (US 
$4,143) and annual rural disposable income to >8,310 RMB (US $1,284) by 2015.
83
 
4. An expansion of urban insurance coverage by 100 million people by 2015.84 
5. Construction of 36 million new housing units to increase the availability of affordable 
urban housing.
85
 The central government has already pledged to build 10 million units of 
government-subsidized housing in 2011, allocating 103 billion RMB from the central 
government budget, 400-500 billion RMB from the local governments, and expecting 
commercial developers to contribute 500-900 billion RMB for the 1.3 trillion RMB 
project.
86
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4.2 Small private enterprise support 
Meanwhile, the central government started the Work Plan on Reducing the Costs on small 
private Enterprises in the Real Economy in order to constantly improve their competitiveness 
and market opportunities. The the 12th FYP focused on reducing the tax burden of businesses 
and raised VAT and business tax thresholds for small and micro businesses. 
87
 Until 2016, at the 
conclusion of the 12th FYP, across-the board implementation of trials to replace business tax 
with VAT reduced the tax burden on businesses by 573.6 billion RMB.
88
 In addition, industrial 
enterprises with annual revenue of 20 million RMB or more from their main business operations 
spent 74.1 billion RMB less on interest payments than they did in previous years.
89
 Meanwhile, 
transportation costs were cut by 6 billion RMB as a result of trials of drop and pull transport, by 
29 billion RMB as result of reductions and exemptions of expressway tolls for fresh agricultural 
products.
90
 
4.3 Relaxing state control of investment and financing system: 
The government used the public-private partnership (PPP) model and other measures such as 
granting franchise and subsidizing private investment to encourage and guide the involvement of 
nongovernmental capital in the construction and operation of infrastructure and public utilities.
91 
 
Until 2016, at the conclusion of the 12th FYP, the non-governmental sourced investment has 
increased to 61.2% (excluding rural households) of GDP.
92
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The Chinese government made the development of a “harmonious society” a key priority for its 
administration, and the 12th FYP continued that focus under the rubric of “inclusive growth,” 
which meant spreading the benefits of economic growth to a wider community.
93 Interestingly, 
the 12th FYP Guidelines previous creed of “Strong State, Wealthy People” (国强民富 or 
guoqiang minfu) was edited into “Wealthy People, Strong State”, (民富 国强 or minfu 
quoqiang), implying that “Wealthy People” was now the greater priority.94 Improved livelihoods 
were in turn expected to boost consumption as a percentage of GDP growth, a key goal for the 
12th FYP.  
5. Despite “Twelfth Five-year Plan,” GDP still fell  
All of these policies aimed to increase economic growth, strike a balance between the proportion 
of consumption and investment in the GDP structure. But in general, these series of policies 
introduced by the government did not effectively increase consumption. The rate of economic 
growth still continued to fall from 10.4% in 2011 to 6.7% in 2016.
95
 
5.1 What is wrong of the "Twelfth Five-year Plan? 
 As economist Tyler Cowen writes, "China’s transition from an investment-driven growth and 
the prominence of manufacturing – relying on cheap local inputs (labour, capital, energy, land), 
foreign technology and foreign demand – to a domestic consumption-driven growth model, with 
a dominant tertiary sector and high local innovation capabilities, is not a simple, linear, or brief 
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endeavor.”96 Consumption, services have not been strong enough to offset the decline in 
manufacturing and construction.
97
 
Lin Yifu further breaks from the economic consensus when he advocates for what China should 
do: growth should continue to be led by investment rather than consumption.
98
 One of the 
biggest mistakes it is making today is to pursue so-called “consumption-driven” growth.99 The 
myth here – that everyone in the market seems to buy into – is that China invests too much and 
growth can only be maintained if it shifts to a consumption-driven model instead.
100
  Lin’s fear is 
that consumption without investment — especially investment in industrial upgrading, 
environmental protection, tech innovation, and infrastructure improvement — will restrain 
productivity growth.
101
 Without healthy productivity growth, incomes will remain low and 
therefore the expected consumption-led growth won’t materialize.102  Moreover, some of the 
Chinese specialists state that the artificial stimulation of consumer spending could be more 
dangerous than investment, providing examples from the 1997-1998 Asian financial crisis and 
from the global collapse of 2008-2009.
103
 
The Development Bank of Singapore Group Research Institute has also put forward a similar 
question to Chinese economy: 
“In world economy, since when did consumption ever drive growth? When the 
industrial revolution took off in the 18th century? When the US laid its railroads 
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and interstate highways in the 19th and 20th? When the Asian Tigers roared after 
WWII?  No. All these growth phases were driven by massive amounts of saving 
and investment, not the purchase of watches and sports cars and nights on the 
town.”104  
 
Therefore, not the axiom “spend more and invest less” should be the solution for rebalancing the 
Chinese economy, but the quality of investment in high technology and education, in order to 
increase the total factor productivity.
105
 Other studies underscore that China needs to increase the 
efficiency of input use, to innovate and make the shift to higher value services.
106
 Still, 
investment should continue to play a significant role. 
With any doubt, the current economic development strategy can no longer drive the Chinese 
economy into long term rapid growth by either building a consumption-driven economic growth 
model or maintaining a current investment-driven model. Further aggressive fiscal policy and 
loose monetary policy (e.g., interest rate cut, and the Chinese version of quantitative easing)
107
 to 
retain a high investment rate will not generate a high GDP growth. China’s economic growth 
entered into a new stage, characterized by a slower economic growth and numerous pending 
structural challenges.
108 
6. SOEs as a key role in China's economic problem 
Corporate governance reform in China is one of the key tasks of SOEs reform and its approach 
was based on the argument that domestic investment mainly reflects government behavior, 
because the investment of SOEs makes up of one third of domestic investment, accounting for 
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more than 40 percent of total GDP.
109
 SOEs are the main tool to boost national economic 
development and growth in China. However, they are seen as being bloated in size and 
inefficient while commanding significant resources but also low productivity and high debt.
110
 
Research on the structural problems of the SOEs mainly deals with the inefficacy of financial 
mechanisms in the Chinese economy and the economic behavior of SOEs to see whether the 
functional corporate governance shows healthy progress in Chinese economic development and 
growth. The SOEs’ performance in the Chinese economy is a useful indicator with which to 
begin. 
6.1 Central government authorizes SOEs to lead the investment-driven strategy in China 
With heavy state banks’ funding, the state-owned enterprises (SOEs) are primed to dominate 
Chinese economic growth. Looking at the list of the Chinese companies in the world's 500 
largest companies, the Future Global 500 companies, one sees that there are 98 total mainland 
Chinese companies in this list, and 88 of these Chinese companies are SOEs.
111
 These centrally 
owned firms, or yangqi, controlled more than. $5.6 trillion in assets at the end of 2013, including 
more than $690 billion abroad.
112
 Moreover, the SOEs have many privileges through government 
protection, such as having preferential access to external financing, low financing costs, 
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government contracts and bailouts, tax benefits, government subsidies and favorable policies, 
such as soft budget constraint.
113 
6.2 The early SOEs’ reform and Dual-track system in the 1980s 
In the 1980s, China moved to corporatize SOEs into a competitive market economy and improve 
their governance mechanism
114 
to let these big state enterprises become joint-stock corporations, 
sold shares to public and listed them on the Shanghai Stock Exchange. They still remained under 
state control, however.
115
  
The SOEs in the early of 1980 did not have many market demands to target. China’s initial 
departure from the planned economy was to bridge between the two with a coexistence of a 
traditional planned economy and market channels for the allocation of a given good.
116
 This 
“dual-track system” was able to keep the central governmental as the main national economic 
target while opening the market economy. Rather than dismantling the plan, reformers 
acquiesced to a continuing role for the plan in order to ensure stability and guarantee attainment 
of some key government priorities (in the Chinese case, primarily investment in energy and 
infrastructure).
117
 Even until today, when China has transformed from a planned economy into a 
relative market economy, the dual-track system still exists for the government as a tool to reach 
its national economic targets while discounting the role of market merchandise. The central 
government's uninterrupted financial support of SOEs makes state-owned enterprises the 
dominate financial priority. With vast governmental financing and its prior policies, SOEs are 
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able to distort marketplace to their advantage without worrying about “normal” demand market 
forces in the economy. 
6.3 Politburo/corporate leadership corrupt marketplace 
Since the behavior of SOEs mostly depends on the delegation of power in the Chinese 
government, SOEs’ economic targets are not fully market driven. SOEs’ performance diminishes 
in the absence of effective external monitoring mechanisms.
118
 In China, the central government 
considered each province’s GDP growth rate as a factor to judge and grade each province’s 
progress of economic achievement. If one of the provinces could boast a relative higher GDP 
growth rate, the general secretary of that province would get a chance at political promotion. 
Even until today, the central government still uses this factor as a standard to judge a provincial 
governor's progress.  As a result, the goal for SOEs in each provincial government is to boost the 
GDP growth rate as high as possible without any consideration of market demand.  This 
incentivizes each provincial government to promote local economic expansion through 
investment without considering of potential costs.
119
 Many large investments are not market 
behavior, but government practice, which leads the state-owned enterprises to turn a blind eye to 
the cost of project expansion. The capacity, production, and market share goals are not 
profitability or efficiency as to would follow the benchmarks of market supply.
120
 The direct 
support from state banks for SOEs capacity growth through direct and indirect measures—
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including preferential loans, subsidies, and discounted resources for production, are estimated to 
lower financing costs 40 percent to 50 percent below the benchmark lending rate.
121
  
“Under this kind of investment-led strategy, economic stimulus program appears to have been 
too large, too intensely focused on fixed assets capital intensive strategy.” Mukherji wrote in 
2012.
122
 The investments are sometimes misallocated by the government without a correct 
market-demand measurement.
123
 The excess capacity led to deflation in output prices (Lin, 
2014).
124
 At the macroeconomic level, investment in inventories has been negative, signaling 
excessive production capacity (Zhang, 2006).
125
 Also, the problem of industrial overcapacity in 
the contribution of GDP has shown a rule of diminished return of capital in economics and it has 
also shown a declining Return-On-Investment Capital rate (ROIC) in heavy industries.
126
 
Chinese SOEs started to face, sluggish demand, weak pricing, and high leverage
127
and SOEs 
profits have been steadily declining in recent years, falling 6.7 percent year-on-year in 2015 and 
8.5 percent year-on-year in the first half of 2016.
128
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6.4 The overcapacity problem 
Overcapacity initially sustained China’s economy through pricing and market advantages. These 
policies have distorted resource allocation and diverted investments from productive uses, 
resulting in damaging consequences for China’s domestic economy at large.129 (Table 3) 
In China’s steel industry, for example, 40 percent of domestic producers are state-owned.130 
Chinese steel producers experienced losses of $15.5 billion due to overcapacity in 2015.
131
 This 
has led approximately half of China’s medium and large-sized steel firms being unprofitable.132 
Meanwhile, aluminum utilization rates in China have also seen declines, dropping to 76 percent 
in 2015, a two percentage point decrease from 2008 levels.
133
 Of the world’s six largest 
aluminum producers, two—Aluminum Corporation of China Limited (Chalco) and China Power 
Investment Corp. (CPI)—are Chinese SOEs.134 
 
 
Table 3 Select Chinese Overcapacity
135 
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The state-owned enterprises' unmetered expansion of local construction under the conditions of 
extremely unmetered governmental funding resulted in the newly produced capacity that cannot 
be absorbed by the market. In the long run, the problem of over-capacity with uninterrupted cash 
flow had increased the pressure of debt problems in the Chinese economy. In the first quarter of 
2016, corporate debt for all Chinese companies rose to 169 percent of GDP (up from 108 percent 
in 2008), compared to 72 percent in the first quarter of 2016 for the United States., which is 
considered having very high debt.
136
 Dr. Lipton indicates that SOEs account for around 55 
percent of corporate debt. According to Chinese regulators, nonperforming loans (NPLs) held by 
Chinese banks amounted to $300 billion, or 2.15 percent of total loans, at the end of May 
2016.
137
 He concluded that Chinese SOEs are “essentially on life support,” warning that if the 
problem is not dealt with soon it could evolve into a larger crisis.
138
 Since local government only 
focuses on maximizing the achievements but neglecting costs, once the excessive expansion of 
the production scale cannot be digested by the market, the loss can only be borne by the whole 
society. 
6.5 How will China deal with the overcapacity problem? 
China's central government-administered state-owned enterprises (SOEs) have pledged to cut 
production overcapacity in some industrial sectors. For example, SOEs unveiled plans to cut its 
steel and coal capacity by at least 10% over five years, reducing potential global supply by 5% in 
early 2016.
139
 However, the solution for how to deal with the current existed excessive capacities 
has become a very hard nut to crack for Chinese government. Since 2013, the Communist Party 
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started to outline the strategy and road map for comprehensive reforms to meet China's 
overcapacity challenges. One such solution is implement the "going out" strategy through the old 
“Silk Road” route, known as the “Belt and Road Initiative” plan to boost overseas economic 
demand and cooperation.
140
 Since many BRI countries are in the “developing world” with 
infrastructure and construction projects, they provide opportunities for Chinese industry to sell 
their inventory abroad. If Chinese enterprises shift it out, it will be a win-win situation.
141
  
It’s the Chinese version of a Bretton Woods system, complete with its own monetary framework 
using RMB (yuan).
142
 It has also been compared to the U.S. Marshall Plan, which provided 
export markets for new post-war North American industry.
143
 
However, some economists think China’s Belt and Road Initiative will not solve the problem for 
Chinese enterprises because many of the developing countries along the Belt and Road are 
politically volatile, economically vulnerable and the investment capital overseas cannot provide 
the stability or security necessary to see these projects through, nor guarantee that counterparts 
will hold on to their end of the bargain.
144
 
In the next chapter, we review the Belt and Road Initiative to discover the advantages and 
challenges for SOEs during this large, international economic cooperation. 
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Chapter 2 - China’s Belt and Road Initiative: Strategic rationales, risks, challenges & 
implications for SOEs 
 
1. What is the Belt and Road Initiative? 
In the fall of 2013, President. Xi Jinping officially announced the strategic framework of 
building the “Silk Road Economic Belt” and a counterpart “21st Century Maritime Silk Road.” 
The official name of this economic initiative is collectively referred to in abbreviated form in 
Chinese parlance as the “Belt and Road Initiative” (BRI) – from the Chinese yi dai yi lu(一带一
路）, literally One Belt One Road,145 The Silk Road Economic Belt is a land route connecting 
China with BRI markets through a network of rail lines, roads and airports, a modern-day 
version of the ancient Silk Road trade route connecting China to the Mediterranean Sea.
146
 The 
New Maritime Silk Road runs through a vast sea area, starting from China's coast and reaching 
Eastern Europe and East Africa through the South China Sea and Indian Ocean in one route, and 
reaching South Pacific through the South China Sea in the other route.
147
 Therefore, the Belt and 
Road Initiative is a commitment to easing bottlenecks to trade by improving and building 
networks of connectivity across Central, Western and Southern Asia, but also reaching out to the 
Middle East as well as East and North Africa.
148
 Paolo Magri writes that “This economic project 
refers to what was historically called the Silk Road, stretching from China through Central 
Asia.”149  
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Figure 3 Source: Image from Roman Wilhelm/ MERICS June 2015
150
 
Not a surprise, there is a plan to build a contemporary Silk Road economic corridor, and it will 
be much broader in scope than its predecessors. It will connect and strengthen economic capacity 
with South East Asia, Middle East, Eastern Europe as well as east coast of Africa
151
 through 
building efficient transport conduits in various BRI countries which will create more effectively 
support supply chains and lower transportation costs.
152
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2. Belt and Road Initiative is the current world's largest economic cooperation 
According to the proposed BRI development plan, there are 65 countries along the Belt and Road 
that have been mentioned as being eligible in this project.
153
 The Global Sourcing Fung Business 
Intelligence Center has published a research paper, computation by Helen Chin, Winnie He, 
saying that the Belt and Road Initiative comprises roughly 62.3%, 30.0% and 24.0% of the 
world’s population, world’s GDP and world’s household consumption, respectively, today.154 
Furthermore, the emerging markets in this initiative are very diverse in terms of economic and 
socio-political structures, and also cultural and religious backgrounds.
155
 Economically, many 
BRI countries are low- to middle income countries, with per capita GDP ranging from less than 
USD $1,000 to slightly over USD $20,000.
156
 
 
China’s SOEs will play a primary role in infrastructure-related industries in the BRI focusing on 
infrastructure projects of building highways, railways, and ports etc. until 2017, about 50 
Chinese state-owned corporate giants have invested or participated in nearly 1,700 projects in 
countries along the new BRI routes.
157 
As the main financial founder of the BRI, China will finance the various types of connectivity at 
the core of the initiative, supporting infrastructure projects in strategically located developing 
countries by extending huge loans to the host governments.158 “The core of the initiative is 
China’s capital abundance and efforts to export capital in the form of investment and loans 
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abroad, with the PRC government proposing to push as much as $1 trillion out of China through 
[BRI]. Included in this funding is a New Silk Road Fund of $40 billion and, most significantly, 
as much as $900 billion from the China Development Bank, under China’s State Council, the 
highest executive body in the PRC government.”159 Most of the loans will be in transport 
facilities such as road, rail, port construction, which will cover the area of Asia, Eastern Europe 
and east Africa, as well as less developed parts of China.
160
 China is once again using the 
investment-driven and capital-intensive strategy as it used in domestic economic development.  
3. Non-BRI countries invited to invest 
In 2016, China launched a new multilateral development bank called the Asian Infrastructure 
Investment Bank (AIIB). The bank’s stated goals are to synergize non-BRI financial partner 
resources with China’s expertise in building infrastructure to help development in other parts of Asia 
and it is a key mechanism for building “infrastructure connectivity”.161 As of 2017, there were 57 
countries that had submitted their applications and became the founding members of the AIIB. At the 
same time, the AIIB quickly began financing activities, and has now approved $2 billion of loans 
for twelve infrastructure projects in member states (Table 4, Next page).
162
 Swiss Re Institute has 
estimated that total investments in BRI projects (including but not restricted to infrastructure) up 
to the year 2030 will amount to around USD $7.4 trillion, of which more than 80% will be in 
infrastructure.
163
 China is the largest voting veto power has the shareholding of 30.34 per cent 
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and it has retained 26.06 per cent of the voting rights for certain key decisions. The decisions in 
the AIIB where China has a veto power include: increasing the bank’s capital, increasing the 
capital subscription of a member, expanding the operations of the bank, changing the size of the 
 
Table 4. AIIB funded projects, April 2016
164
 
board of directors, changing the structure of the board, appointing or removing the president, 
suspending a member; terminating the bank and distributing its assets; and amending the 
articles.
165
 
4 How does the BRI benefit China? 
4.1 Political achievement 
The Belt and Road Initiative is China’s new economic strategy aimed at further connecting its 
domestic market with the global market,
166
 as well as a new diplomatic strategy to enhance 
China’s foreign relations with countries along the belt and road.167 
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Daniel C. O’Neill, University of the Pacific School of International Studies has analyzed several 
cases about China’s political-economic relations with BRI countries. He has pointed how 
Chinese foreign aid and loans provide influence over authoritarian government leaders, securing 
protection for major investments by Chinese SOEs – investments necessary for China’s 
continued economic development, a key pillar of the Chinese Communist Party’s legitimacy.168 
This influence is often referred to as “soft power.” 
4.2 Economic Industrial Relief 
 
While the central government’s official statement said that the BRI is a welfare program from 
Chinese industry for the country’s poorer neighbors, many analysts have discussed a range of 
more self-interested Chinese economic motives. A key motive behind the initiative is to mitigate 
the current overcapacity in Chinese heavy industries and construction sectors with the large 
infrastructure projects that the initiative would require. China’s BRI strategy represents an option 
to investing abroad to use this excess capacity
169
 In steel, aluminum, and cement; sustaining 
gross domestic product growth, which is needed to maintain social stability and to provide 
capital for struggling Chinese national and state-owned enterprises.
170
  
 
5 Risks and challenges for China’s BRI 
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The path to establishing BRI is not easy. Chinese firms must face unfamiliar systems. In each 
zone, they must adapt to the host country’s political system, policies and laws, languages and 
cultures, etc. Also, since these zones are primarily located in developing countries, SOEs also 
have to face structural challenges, macroeconomic risk, political risk, security risk, legal and 
regulatory challenges, poor governance and corruption in partner states.
171
 
5.1 Political risks 
Political risk can be a major obstacle for any infrastructure scheme, especially cross-border 
projects. It is particularly problematic if foreign investors face not only potential change in 
government but also actual change in regime type, which could lead to a governing coalition 
with radically different policy preferences.
172
 Potential leadership change in Angola, Thailand, 
Kazakhstan, Zambia, and Kenya is a source of general political and policy uncertainty.
173 
One particular example is when the negotiations to build a section of high-speed rail line from 
Kunming to Singapore temporarily broke down after Thailand refused to grant China 
development rights to adjacent land, and claimed to be able to get financing from Japan at better 
rates.
174
 Wang Weixing writes that internal instability in Thailand led to the cancellation of a 
China-Thailand high-speed rail plan.
175
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5.2 Corruption along the planned BRI 
Infrastructure projects are vulnerable 
to corruption. Based on expert 
opinion from the book of Corruption 
Perceptions Index 2015,
176
 the 65 
countries along the Belt and Road are 
considered corrupted according to 
their map. (Figure 4177 right) 
In Southeast Asia, corruption remains a 
huge challenge. In India and Sri Lanka, leaders are falling short of their bold promises, while 
governments in Bangladesh and Cambodia are exacerbating corruption by clamping down on 
civil society.
178
 In Afghanistan and Pakistan a failure to tackle corruption is feeding ongoing 
vicious conflicts, while China’s prosecutorial approach isn’t bringing sustainable remedy to the 
menace. This inability to tackle root causes holds true across the region.
179 
In addition, Laos’ 
corruption is a key constraint at all levels: “The politically powerful avoid paying tax, accept 
‘commissions’ for facilitating projects or awarding contracts, and pocket pay-offs for reducing 
charges, duties or taxes for family and friends.” 180 
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In the Middle East, most countries have maintained serious corruption, and some (Egypt, Libya, 
Morocco, Syria and Tunisia) have deteriorated slightly. Political corruption in particular remains 
a huge challenge.
181
 
In Eastern Europe, Ukraine also does badly, as the government drags its heels on reform.
182
In 
Hungary, Poland and Turkey, politicians and their cronies are increasingly hijacking state 
institutions to shore up power, a worrying trend also affecting the Balkans.
183
Also, Russia uses 
corruption to infiltrate not only the political system, but especially their country’s economy. 
Non-transparent privatization of major economic objectives allows Russia to infiltrate its capital 
into the economy, or to take control of enterprises it sees as competitors, and weaken them. Yet 
the main drive of corruption in these countries is not Russia but local elites, most of them with 
direct ties or the same people from the former (communist) regime.
184
 
5.3  Corruption within China 
Corruption is considered as one of the biggest hurdles facing the Chinese government, as it has 
the effect of thwarting economic growth by perpetuating poverty and income inequality, and 
discouraging foreign investments into the country.
185
Also, corruption is a major problem for 
business in China.
186
 Regionally, corruption follows power and money.
187
 Reports of bribes were 
most common in the Beijing Region, where officialdom is concentrated, and least so in the 
West.
188
 (Fig 5, Next page) In fact, the incidence of corrupt payments was above average in all 
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the more developed and dynamic regions—Beijing (43%), Guangdong (39%), Chongqing 
(38%), and Shanghai (34%)—and below average in the less developed and peripheral North 
(29%), Northeast (27%), Southwest (27%), and West (19%).
189
  
Corrupt practices committed by insiders, especially those by the Chief Managers have harmed 
China's state-owned enterprises (SOEs).
190
 Wenhao Cheng analysed 264 corruption cases 
involving SOEs from 1999 to 2001 and published by the Justice Network of the Procuratorate 
Daily (Jiancha ribao zhengyi wang 检察日报正义网), a government publication about 
corruption cases. He carried out an empirical study on subjects, motivations and patterns of 
corruption in SOEs.
191
 
  
Figure 5: Reports of Corruption – By Region (Percent reporting paying bribes to operate) 
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5.4  Who benefits most from corruption?  
Local-level officials, who enjoy the power and regulatory control to help or make life hell for 
business in their domains, are also the main beneficiaries of corruption.
193
 The second most-
frequent takers were tax collectors (56%), who can make companies’ tax bills swell or shrink. 
These results were fairly uniform across the country, underlining that bribery risks from local 
and tax officials are real.
194
  
6 The terrorism issue along the BRI countries  
 
A related issue is the impact of nontraditional security challenges on BRI projects. Perhaps the 
most commonly cited problem in the Chinese literature is the threat of terrorism and violent 
extremism.
195
 Some scholars contend that extremists might oppose the BRI on ideological 
grounds, since economic development strengthens existing regimes, whereas radical groups often 
seek to subvert them.
196
 Wang Yiwei also notes that development makes it harder for extremists 
to recruit new members and influence public opinion.
197
 BRI projects and workers might make 
attractive targets for financially motivated attacks, including kidnappings for ransom and theft of 
property, such as drilling machinery, oil, and communications equipment.
198
 Also, aside from 
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direct losses, attacks could also impose indirect economic costs as firms spend more on security 
services and insurance premiums rise.
199
 
There are also physical dangers facing BRI personnel at the operational level.
200 
 From a Chinese 
perspective, this is an evolving but not intrinsically new problem. Chinese firms and citizens 
have “gone out” in search of economic opportunities over the last two decades, often in 
dangerous developing world locations.
201
 Chen Xiangyang, deputy director of CICIR’s Institute 
of World Politics, assesses that a reduction of U.S. forces will negatively impact the security 
situation in Afghanistan and “surrounding countries,” which could pose dangers for BRI projects 
in the region (including Pakistan).
202
 Fu Mengzi and Lou Chunhao write that an intensifying 
India-Pakistan conflict, reflected in an October 2014 border incident in Kashmir that was the 
deadliest since 2003, will threaten projects under both CPEC (China Pakistan Economic 
Corridor) and the BCIM (Bangladesh–China–India–Myanmar Forum for Regional Cooperation) 
economic corridor.
203
 
In some of these cases, Chinese workers have been subject to terrorist attacks, such as those 
which resulted in the deaths of 14 Chinese nationals in Afghanistan and Pakistan in 2004 and 
which led to suspended projects as Chinese workers were withdrawn.
204
  These large-scale 
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disruptions have led to the destruction of property and required Chinese government to carry out 
evacuations. Most famous is the 2011 evacuation of 35,000 Chinese citizens from Libya, though 
China conducted a dozen other evacuations between 2006 and 2014 in areas such as Thailand, 
Syria, and Vietnam.
205
  
Lin Limin, director of CICIR’s Foreign Strategy Research Center, assesses that the BRI traverses 
a “geopolitical black hole,206 ”marked by “unstable regimes.”207 This has led many investors to 
“turn back,” and made it difficult to launch a high-speed rail network.208 Major General Wang 
Weixing, director of the Foreign Military Studies Department at the Academy of Military 
Sciences (AMS), likewise notes that “the BRI route passes through many geopolitically fragile 
areas, with complex historical issues, intense ethnic and religious disputes, and frequent armed 
conflict.”209 In another article, Wang argues that “religious violence,” in particular, can 
“completely throw the BRI’s construction into chaos and threaten the security of China’s 
investment projects and personnel.
210
 
7  High financial risk in BRI 
Financial risk takes on a different facet in BRI projects. The high capital intensity of these 
projects might lead to a high debt service ratio, long pay-off periods, and uncertainty of forecast 
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demand.
211
 The challenges are often exacerbated in cross-border projects where the structuring 
of finance needs to take into account different currencies and national financial capacities.
212
 
“As the size of the public debt increases, there is growing uncertainty about 
actions and policies that the government will resort to in order to meet its debt 
servicing obligations, with adverse effects on investment. In particular, as the 
stock of public sector debt increases, there may be expectations that the 
government’s debt service obligations will be financed by distortionary measures 
(the inflation tax, for example), as in Agénor and Montiel (1996). The extensive 
literature on uncertainty and investment suggests that in these circumstances, 
potential private investors will prefer instead to exercise their option of waiting 
(Serven (1997)). Moreover, any investment that takes place is likely to be diverted 
to activities with quick returns rather than to long-term, high-risk, irreversible 
projects. Rapid accumulation of debt can also be accompanied by increasing 
capital flight if the private sector fears imminent devaluation and/or increases in 
taxes to service the debt (Oks and Wijnbergen (1995)).”213 
 
The Chinese government has taken on the lead financing role, since many developing countries 
have limited financial condition to fund the BRI projects in their countries.
214
 Reviewing the map 
of the global public debt 2015, the majority of BRI countries are considered “high debt” 
countries. They include the Philippines, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Indonesia, Sri Lanka, Egypt, 
Turkey, Laos, Vietnam, Ukraine, Armenia, Belarus, etc. Many of these developing countries 
default on foreign lending and investment projects as they are especially dysfunctional with 
corrupt governments.
215
 This lack of creditworthiness makes these countries poor bets for 
investment on the part of China’s government and Chinese financial institutions and 
businesses.
216
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In Sri-Lanka, several completed projects are now bleeding money borrowed from China.
217
  The 
example of “Sri Lanka’s Mattala Rajapaksa International Airport, which opened in 2013 near 
Hambantota, has been dubbed the world’s emptiest.  Sri Lanka is now struggling to deal with 
debt from Chinese-backed infrastructure projects.”218  
Meanwhile, “Hambantota’s Magampura Mahinda Rajapaksa Port remains largely idle, as does 
the multibillion-dollar Gwadar port in Pakistan. The former Pakistani Prime Minister Shaukat 
Aziz spoke at the Belt and Road forum emphasizing his experience in office restructuring his 
country’s foreign debt. That default is unlikely to be Pakistan’s last.”219 Part of the debt 
renegotiation resulted in control of the Hambantota Port being given back to China for 99 
years.
220
 
Moreover, Laos faces a huge debt burden. The International Monetary Fund warned in 2017 that 
the country’s reserves stood at two months of prospective imports of goods and services.221 It 
also expressed concerns that public debt could rise to around 70 percent of the economy.
222
 In 
2017, Laos has an $800 million loan from China’s Export-Import Bank and agreed to form a 
joint venture with China that will borrow much of the rest.
223
 
8 High risk fears predict low ROI (Return on Investment) 
Andrew Warner assesses the econometric evidence to reveal small positive and instantaneous 
associations in many developing countries between public investment booms and economic 
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growth, but little long run impact.
224
 He notices that several aspects of the evidence cast doubt on 
the idea that past booms triggered or accelerated GDP growth through public investment. Most 
of the positive association occurs immediately; a spending boom tends to be immediately 
associated with a rise in GDP this year, but not subsequent years.
225
 He states that F-tests fail to 
reject that the long run impact, given by the sum of the coefficients on lagged investment booms, 
is zero.
226
 It is argued that the booms only had a causal impact, since this kind of evidence is 
consistent with reverse causality, from GDP growth to investment booms, as spending is cut in 
slumps and increased in good years.
227
 
In addition, Presbitero finds that investment and infrastructure projects are less likely to be 
successful when they are undertaken during periods of higher-than-average public investment, 
which is particularly relevant in light of the BRI “big-push” approach to infrastructure 
investment.
228
 
Furthermore, he writes that a recent trend in several low-income developing countries has been a 
rapid scaling-up of public investment. However, he argued that in the presence of limited 
absorptive capacity, countries are not able – in terms of skills, institutions, and management – to 
translate additional public investment into sustained output growth.
229
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Keefer and Knack (2007) show evidence that public investment is “dramatically higher in 
governments with low-quality governance and limited political checks and balances.”230 They 
attribute this to the fact that public investment is conducive for rent-seeking.  
9 Testing the wisdom of the BRI and SOEs 
 
As we have seen before, the BRI has security risks, political risks, social risks, and legal risks. 
SOEs will face much more complicated conditions than their conditions in China.  
In order to stand out as internationalized competitive enterprises, China’s SOEs should first 
consider the following issues:  
• How to integrate the BRI with the enterprise’s own long-term strategy. 
• How to adjust the company’s industry and product portfolios.  
• If applicable, how will SOEs overcome the difficulties mentioned above. 
• How can the company comprehensively manage risks? How can it establish a system of 
crisis management, including early warning and post-crisis feedback mechanisms?
231
  
• Which internal and external abilities need to be improved? 232 
9.1 Many SOEs have immature overseas market development 
Overall, the proportion of total revenue coming from overseas operations for China’s SOEs is 
significantly lower than that of leading multinational companies in the Global 500.
233
 
Meanwhile, a survey shows that for 43 percent of China’s SOEs, their overseas revenue currently 
accounts for less than 5 percent of their total revenue; for 60 percent of China’s SOEs, the 
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proportion is less than 10 percent.
234
 This demonstrates that the majority of China’s SOEs are 
still in the early stage of overseas market development and their overseas revenue potential has 
yet to be realized. 
Moreover, most of the senior management teams of large Chinese SOEs who may potentially 
engage with BRI-related projects are appointed by the Communist Party and equipped with 
industrial expertise. They are usually unfamiliar with the market environments of host countries 
with little understanding of local labour union politics.
235
  Their understanding of local 
environments is still insufficient at the bidding stage, the risk control mechanism is unsound at 
the construction stage and post-construction management is weak.
236
 
Generally, SOEs’ supply-driven projects are victim to waste, inefficiency and 
unaccountability.
237
Apart from a large number of engineers, evaluating the viability of BRI 
projects requires SOEs be familiar with the respective regions inside-out, demand project 
management teams have special knowledge of the local labor market and understand the host 
countries’ fiscal and monetary policies.238 The track-record of Chinese SOEs in Africa are 
exemplary of these problems.
239
 
9.2 Will SOEs domestic failures be duplicated abroad? 
Low profitability of SOEs has been a major concern by economists. It is closely related to SOEs’ 
unhealthy assets, which bring little or no return to the firms.
240
As shown in Tables 5-7 below, the 
relationship between the ratio of unhealthy asset to total asset and the profitability of SOEs 
depends on the measure of profitability and methods of estimation. The ratio of unhealthy assets 
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to total assets, is negatively related to the profitability of SOEs in all of the cross-sectional 
regressions when profitability is measured by ROE (return on equity), ROA (return on assets), 
PMNA (profit margin on net assets).
241
  
Return on equity, ROE, the relationship between profitability and liability–asset ratio becomes 
insignificant (see Table 5). Also, when return on assets, ROA is used as a measure of 
profitability, the relationship of the coefficient of liability–asset ratio become significantly 
negative in one of the two cross-sectional regressions, but insignificant in all of the panel 
regressions (see Table 6). PMNA, profit margin on net assets, of SOEs negatively affect the 
profitability of the SOEs and the coefficients are highly significant in all cross-sectional and 
panel regressions (see Tables 7, Next page). 
  
Table 5. Determinants of profitability, return on equity
242
 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
240
 Qiao, 92. 
241
 Carsten A. Holz (2002). The impact of competition and labor remuneration on profitability in China’s industrial 
state-owned enterprises. Journal of Contemporary China, 11, 515– 538, 518. 
242
 Ibid, 521. 
49 
 
 
 
  
Table 6. Determinants of profitability, return on asset 
243
 
 
 
Table 7. Determinants of profitability, return on profit earning on net assets (pmna) 
244 
Shaomin Li, Ying Chou Lin, and David D. Selover noted that SOEs tend to hold larger 
inventories than privately owned firms, and this can have a negative effect on earnings.
245
 In 
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corporate finance perspective, large inventories usually have significant negative effects upon the 
return on assets (ROA), return on equity (ROE), return on sales (ROS), productivity, and on firm 
growth.
246
 In addition, by looking at the WACC (Weighted average cost of capital) perceived by 
SOEs and local governments; it is likely lower than the market rate or the rate applied to private 
companies.
247
 Perceiving a much lower WACC, SOEs and local governments likely over-invest, 
while more efficient private firms may under-invest.
248
 
Furthermore, Figure 6 below indicates  that the average ROIC of China’s SOEs is much lower 
than that of non-state firms including collective firms, foreign firms, Hong Kong/Taiwan 
invested firms, private firms, and mixed firms. Based on Qiao Liu’s estimation, between 2001 
and 2005, the average ROIC of the SOEs ranged from 5.3 to 5.8 percent, implying that one 
dollar of capital used in firm operation, after controlling for regional and industrial differences, 
generates less than six cents of 
after-tax profit.
249
 Non-state 
firms in China on average 
generate an ROIC 4 to 6 
percentage points higher than 
that of SOEs.
250
  
Figure 6
251
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Moreover, Shaomin Li, Ying Chou Lin, and David D. Selover investigated that large accounts 
receivables in SOEs have a generally negative effect upon firm performance, including ROA, 
ROE, productivity, and growth of sales.
252
 Large accounts receivables may indicate that the firm 
is not aggressive enough in pursuing the money owed to it or that, perhaps, it chooses to carry 
some bad accounts. SOEs generally show higher accounts receivables than other types of 
firms.
253
 
Table 8 presents measures of the support and aid provided by the government to different types 
of firms, including state-owned enterprises.
254
 The hypothesis is that more state support goes to 
SOEs than are other types of enterprises. This aid may take the form of subsidies, bank loan 
availability, low interest loans, tax breaks, and other resources and benefits. With regard to 
subsidies, it is expected that larger firms in general require larger subsidies.
255
 Both SOEs and 
COEs (collective-owned enterprises) receive more subsidies than do the purely private firms. If it 
scales subsidies by dividing by total sales (Column 2), then the subsidy-sales ratio is, by far, 
higher for state-owned enterprises than for any other type of ownership, followed by the subsidy-
sales ratios for COEs, joint-stock enterprises, and joint ventures, and far lower for the domestic 
and foreign private firms.
256
 The difference between the two measures may reflect the large 
amount of assets held by SOEs.  
Under these conditions, state-owned enterprises do not have to worry as much about competition 
and survival.
257
 They do not depend upon making profits for their own survival, growth, or 
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Table 8. Average Enterprise Performance in 2000 and 2005
258 
 
investment. This creates a distortion of its incentive structure.
259
 The SOEs do not bear risk 
alone, and, consequently, there is a moral hazard risk that the firm will become lax, in terms of 
controlling costs, marketing its products, and promoting innovation.
260
 
As a result, SOEs are afflicted with a pervasive "investment hunger" problem and are prone to 
overinvesting regardless of the demand for their products.
261
 SOE employees may have the 
tendency to develop rent-seeking behavior in order to seek for themselves more resources from 
the government,
262
 increasing costs and for inefficiency.
263
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State-owned enterprises (SOEs) are often claimed to be less profitable and less efficient. The 
unhealthy assets negatively affect a firm’s productivity, paint a depressing future for the firm and 
dampen the firm’s incentives to invest.264 Many economists generally believe that soft budget 
constraint result in inefficient operation. It not only loosen the financial limitations on the SOE 
firms, but it also impacts both the psychology and behavior of the SOE employees to be less 
aggressive in controlling for costs, to be less innovative, and to be less efficient as they don’t 
have to try as hard as the employees of private corporations to ensure the survival of the firm.
265
 
Typically, state-owned enterprise managers have little incentive to improve their business or 
work hard to improve profits. 
Based on the risks of BRI presented, people might believe that, people might believe that SOEs 
engaged in BRI must address bribery risks in a long term. However, their weak management, 
low profitability and poor investment returns make many people think that SOEs’ performances 
so far will suggest failure to make profits in Belt and Road Initiative. 
The government has not planned any actions to enhance SOEs’ capital efficiency and 
productivity in order to improve their competitiveness in BRI. SOEs will still maintain their 
current model to explore BRI market no matter how risky and how inefficient they would be in 
BRI.  Since 2013, President Xi has installed many SOE chief executives as provincial governors, 
which could improve regional bureaucratic systems as they are often “outsiders” not from the 
region, or it could further entrench the status quo.
266
 This venture might make many people raise 
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a question: “why does the Chinese government still wants to maintain its current SOE model to 
explore overseas markets with risks even though they realize their weak performance in the past? 
Won’t they fear this gamble if SOEs fail in BRI?   
The next chapter investigates the theory behind the central government’s dependency on SOEs in 
the BRI and the political consequences of abandoning or altering their strategy. 
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Chapter 3 - Is SOE participation in the BRI worth the cost and the future of the Chinese 
economy? 
 
Due to weak financial management and low investment returns for SOEs, many people think it 
detrimental for China to maintain its current SOE model to explore BRI. What the SOEs should 
do is update their market efficiencies and competitiveness as well as total factor productivities. 
On the other hand, many people contend that the BRI is the only way for SOEs to overcome their 
current domestic stagnation. A significant portion of SOEs cannot allow themselves to truly 
reform their economic structures.  
 
Many people think it is a misguided idea for China to maintain its current SOE growth model to 
explore BRI in order to solve China’s current exhausted domestic economic growth problem. 
They think that the road ahead for SOEs is all about the structural reform of capital efficiency. 
The current SOE model has reached a turning point in its development path after more than 35 
years of rapid growth and SOEs now face the limits of their unsustainable investment-led growth 
model. The current low-return on investment capital ratio in SOEs has directly resulted in a 
lower growth rate in Chinese economy and many people contend that China’s lower growth rate 
in recent years has increased the chance of falling into the so-called the stagnation of a ‘middle 
income trap.’ China should therefore improve SOEs’ financial management by shifting their 
model from being labor & capital intensive to a more high-productive, tech-intensive innovation 
economy. 
On the other hand, however, others say the Belt and Road Initiative is a way for SOEs to 
overcome the ‘new normal’ stage of the stagnation in Chinese economy. They argue that China 
exports on a scale never before witnessed and massive domestic infrastructure investments are 
56 
 
 
 
reaching the point of diminishing returns.
267
 Meanwhile, the migration of surplus labor from the 
rural economy to the cities and the industrial sectors is ending which has approached the so-
called "Lewis turning point.”268 
1. The stagnation of Middle Income trap 
According to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) the ‘middle-income trap’ is a phenomenon 
of a hitherto-rapidly growing economy’s stagnating at middle-income levels and failure to 
graduate into the ranks of high-income countries.
269
 
 
Figure 7
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As Figure 7 shows, China is currently a “upper middle-income country” with a per capital GNI 
of $8250. 
Many countries achieved a certain economic level but began to experience sharply diminishing 
economic growth rates, because they were unable to adopt new sources of economic growth, 
such as innovation.
271
  
Garrett (2004) had warned that middle-income countries might stagnate. In his words, “the 
challenge for the middle-income world is to find ways to "tech-up" and enter the global 
knowledge economy, so as to escape the trap of having to dumb down to compete in 
standardized manufacturing and, increasingly, standardized services… the countries of Latin 
America and eastern Europe are not likely to be able to achieve [the transformation] on their 
own.”272  
China, as one-third of the world’s economic engine, has experienced a persistent growth 
slowdown after it reaches the middle-income level. Chinese SOEs now face extreme pressure to 
upgrade industrial structure and enter more knowledge-intensive industries to maintain dynamic 
growth.  Many economists contend that “this compilation gathers leading Chinese and 
international scholars to consider the new agenda of building an innovation-driven SOEs growth 
model.”273 
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2. Is innovation-driven strategy a trap for SOEs? 
Today, South Korea, Japan, and Singapore have successfully escaped the middle income trap and 
transformed into high income regions. The success of these four significant economic forces in 
East Asia was inseparable from their policies and strategies on improving the innovative capacity 
which contributed to the extraordinary economic growth. These governments absorb foreign 
technology to enhance their innovative system and they put enormous effort and money in 
developing Research and Development (R&D) to achieve the economic boom.  
Even being among these success stories from other Asian cultures, China has not managed to 
achieve such high-tech intensive growth, despite creating a range of R&D platforms and business 
service providers such as engineering research centers and productivity research centers. But 
many of them lack a market-driven orientation.  
Since 1991, China’s R&D investment was RMB 15.08 billion ($2.83 billion), occupying 
approximately 0.7% of overall GDP. In 2013, it increased to RMB 1.185 trillion ($191.44 
billion), about 2.01% of GDP.
274
 In terms of purchasing power parity, China has become the 
second-largest spender on R&D in the world and may have even surpassed the United States.
275
   
Although China’s production of triadic patent families and scientific articles is still very low on a 
per capita basis,
276
 but this is a clear indication of the Chinese government’s commitment to 
increasing the economy’s innovative capacity.277 
Also, research funding for top governmental institutes in China increased dramatically, in the 
overall environment of expanding research institute R&D funding, particularly through the 985 
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Project, which began in 1998, and massively increased research funding for selected groups of 
governmental institutes with the goal of moving them into the ranks of top-tier elite global 
research institutes.
278
 This is also reflected in the pursuit of sixteen huge national science and 
engineering projects identified by the State Council in 2006.
279
  Each of them addresses major 
technologies deemed to be of strategic importance for the Chinese economy, national defense, 
and overall competitiveness.
280
 From 2004 to 2013, both university and research institute R&D 
expenditures increased at a compound annual rate of 18.9 percent and 20.55 percent, respectively 
– in nine years, R&D funding roughly quintupled.281 
China has its own State-run patent system, but many patents have been criticized as being 
ignored or being of little value in China. Much of the increased patenting activity is in response 
to government pressure for so-called “results” and incentives that reward volume instead of real 
scientific significance. As Arie Y. Lewin, Martin Kenney, and Johann Peter Murmann discuss in 
their book, the weakness of technology from government transfer is a combination of 
unproductive and unclear intellectual property (IP) protection, lacking of research of high quality 
and commercial relevance, and necessary capacity by Chinese firms.
282
  
In China, many of R&D platforms and business service providers lack a market orientation.
283
 
Many economists contend that innovation is not something that can be achieved through 
government planning.
284
 They argue that the more private enterprises are involved in the trial-
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and error process of innovation, the greater the chances for technological breakthroughs, and the 
more likely that new discoveries will be translated into commercially viable products.
285 
In Four Tigers, innovative economies, private companies have successfully created national 
innovation systems. Most of the applied research and innovation of consequence for the 
economy is done by private firms.
286
 
As Shapin Steven states in his book: “In all innovative economies, be it the United States, the 
long-time innovation leader, or more recent entrants such as Japan and Korea, private companies 
have successfully created national innovation systems.”287 The emphasis on private sector 
growth is central for the national economic development. Innovation will flourish if firms in 
particular provide researchers with the freedom to pursue interesting ideas in a stimulating work 
environment.
288
 
Therefore, instead of controlling all the research resources and findings for the state purpose, 
government highly supports private enterprises in developing technological capabilities and 
producing innovative products by establishing research and development platforms for those 
companies.
289 However, the innovative systems in China are mostly controlled by governmental 
institutes; as well as State Owned Enterprises. This reflects the absolute dominance of the state in 
China’s factor markets.290 
 The top-down grand plan plays an important role in China even though the bottom-up forces 
have been proven to be more powerful in incentive individuals and companies to focus on 
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economic matters rather than other things.
291
 The state has committed large amounts of resources 
to drive innovations in many crucial areas yet ironically left the private companies alone to 
grow.
292 
Most SOEs operate in industries with high barriers to entry, where competition tends to be weak. 
Many institutional barriers to innovation and entrepreneurship that limited transform from 
government-based science, technology, engineering, and mathematics into private sector. The 
state has committed large amounts of resources to drive innovations in many crucial areas, which 
private companies alone cannot commit.
293 
Hence, the Chinese government did attempt to push the innovative system, yet did so through 
supporting the SOEs instead of the private sector.  
3. Is there any way to improve SOEs’ innovative efficiency in China? 
3.1 Proposal A: Downsizing SOEs 
In 2009, Weiying Zhang, the former head of the Guanghua School of Management at Beijing 
University, estimated that economic reform, including the future reform of SOEs, was left with 
technical problems. In Weiying’s opinion, these technical problems can be solved without Party 
Congresses discussion. In the past several years, Weiying witnessed that a new phenomena 
called “as the state advances, the private sector retreats” reversed the reform carried out in the 
past several years. Weiying suggested the GDP proportion of SOEs should be expected to drop 
to no more than 10% in the future, while they now account for more than 35%. What does 10% 
mean? Before Margaret Thatcher, former UK prime minister, carried out privatization of British 
SOEs, the proportion of British SOEs in the GDP was just 10%. Considering current situations, it 
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will be a great change if the proportion of state-owned enterprises in the GDP drops from 35% to 
about 10%.
294
 
 
Many other economists argue that this idea will hardly work well if integrated with the current 
institutional ideology. First, the state-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission 
(SASAC) in China specified consistently that Chinese economy must let SOEs to play a 
dominant role.
295 
Mr. Xi has also made similar remarks over the past several years.
296 From the 
institutional perspective, the strategies to escape the middle-income trap entail a tendency for 
China to shift to a more democratic system that would threaten the absolute authority of the 
Party. Thus, the examples of such innovative reform by privatization in South Korea and Japan 
are unacceptable for China to follow within the established CCP institution.
297
 
Besides the political concern, a proportional decline of SOEs would also negatively affect 
employment by laying off workers and creating social instability. The inefficient and 
overmanned SOEs have been a big headache for the socialist state. China has approximately 
150,000 SOEs which, account for 30 to 40 percent of total GDP and about 20 percent of China’s 
total employment.
298 
To preserve their competitiveness, there was no option but to push for 
reforms throughout, including bankruptcy and massive redundancy. And yet China’s unique 
socio-political context made large-scale lay-offs politically risky.
299
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The government has been reluctant to encourage SOEs to layoff redundant workers for fear of an 
increase in unemployment and social instability. It is notorious for often requiring the SOEs to 
maintain a surplus of employees in order to keep a low unemployment level, to provide 
satisfying level of benefits to the employees, and to sell the products at a lower price to the 
government.
300
  
Under the growing challenge of market competition, the survival of SOEs depends critically on 
the release of unwanted staff. If not handled well, the massive layoffs could trigger potential 
protests and erode social stability.
301
  
3.2 SOEs structural reform during 1990s caused huge social instabilities 
 
Table 9. Number of xiagang 
workers, 1993-2002
302
 
 
Looking back to the SOE 
structural reform of the 
transition from a state-
planning to a market-
based system during 
1987-1999, the Zhu 
Rongji Administration decided to allow the majority of loss making large and medium-sized 
SOEs to escape from their current predicaments (sannian tuokun).303 From then on, only the key 
enterprises would be retained while the rest would be let go, namely ‘grip the large and let go of 
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the small’ (zhuada fangxiao).304 This strategy gave the green light for the revamping of small and 
medium-sized SOEs. Most significantly, it legitimized massive lay-offs of the surplus 
workforce.
305
  
The massive lay-offs increased the number of unemployed workers much faster (See Table 9, 
Previous page). In 1993, there were 3 million unemployment workers. The number rose from 3.6 
million in 1994 to 5.6 million in 1995.
306
 In 1999, this number approached the peak of 9.37 
million.
307
 Under these circumstances, massive lay-offs from the SOEs became inevitable. 
Large layoffs caused China’s employment problem in both rural and urban areas. Table 10308 
shows the rate of unemployment and hidden unemployment both in rural and urban areas. 
China’s urban unemployed was 5.7 million in 1996 and its rural unemployment is shown as 
ranging from 40 to 67 million individuals, while estimates of hidden unemployment figures  
appear to reach from 120 to 180 million.
309
) 
Table 10. Labor Forces and Estimated Unemployment in China, 1996 (in millions 
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According to two surveys polling more than 50 well-known Chinese academics and state 
officials working on labour and employment issues, the real unemployment rate in urban China 
had already reached 7 percent or even worse by 2002.
310 
The unemployed refers to people with 
an urban household registration, between 16 and 45 (for women) or 16 and 50 (for men) years of 
age, who are able and willing to work, but have no work.
311
 
A survey conducted in ten cities by the ministry of Labour and Social Security in June 2001, 
laid-off workers tended to be middle-aged, with an average age of 39.
312
 Their educational 
attainment was also modest: with 39 per cent at junior middle school and 46.7 per cent at senior 
middle school levels. Equally disadvantageous is their skill level: 40.7 percent were graded as 
having deficient skills to reach other job levels, 60 percent of unemployed workers wanted help 
from the state to get back to work.
313
 
According to one source, only 13% of employers will hire workers more than 45 years old and 
61% are seeking candidates between the ages of 16 and 35.
314
 Forty-eight percent of the jobs 
publicly advertised seek candidates with college-level education and only 4.4% were open to 
candidates with less than a junior-high education. It is particularly difficult for middle-aged 
women to find employment.
315
 Even for street-cleaning jobs, one has to be less than 35 years old, 
while 70% of the female Xiagang (layed off workers) were around 40 years old.
316
 
                                                 
310
 Mo, Rong (2002), Jiuye Xingshi Yiran Yanjun (Employment Still Troubling). In Ru Xin, Lu Xueyi and Li Peilin (eds), 
2002. (The Year 2002: Analysis and Forecast of Social Conditions in China), Beijing Social Siences Documentation 
Publishing House, 165-74. 
311
 Wong, and K. Ngok, “Social Policy between Plan and Market: xiagang 158-173. 
312
 Ibid. 
313
 Ibid. 
314
 Zaijiuye gongzuode yanjiu yu shijian (Research and practice on reemployment work) (Beijing: Jingji Guanli 
Chubanshe, 1998), 52. 
315  
Ibid, 52. 
316
 Ibid, 52. 
66 
 
 
 
“For example, Suzhou municipality has about 33,000 xiagang but could not fill 
10,000 jobs largely because laid-off workers found the positions undesirable for 
reasons of location, wage, or type of work. One source reports that about two-
thirds of the xiagang throughout China did not take jobs because the available 
employment options did not meet their expectations”317 
“The large lay-off in SOEs was caused by enterprise difficulty rather than individual 
culpability, is grossly unjust.
318 The lack of train and opportunity for skill 
diversification in state firms further dims people’s employability, on top of their 
age and education disadvantages.”`319 
As a result, deprived of the means of livelihood, more and more unemployed workers took their 
grievances to the streets.
320
 Chinese leaders are only too aware that waves of worker protests can 
explode into rebellions that endanger regime stability. As former President Jiang Zemin 
admitted, the lay-off of urban workers had already created considerable conflicts among the 
people and could spark off serious chaos.
321 Hence, both SOEs and society must share the 
consequences of mass redundancy.  Laying off large numbers of workers caused social and 
political instability in 1990s as manifested in demonstrations, strikes, and petitioning by those 
who have been laid off.
322 
Laying off large numbers of workers in the late 1980s led China to have a large-scale 
consolidation and privatization of SOEs, which greatly improved the atmosphere for private 
business in China.
323
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Nowadays (since 2006), China has proactively pursued multiple forms of business ownership, 
through asset restructuring, mergers and acquisitions, and, under certain conditions, 
bankruptcies, to accelerate the adjustments of the pattern and structure of the state economy.
324
 
However, there are still approximately 150,000 SOEs which account for about 20 percent of 
China’s total employment. The choice to downsize the proportion of SOEs to a desired goal of 
10 percent would likely kick off another undesired unemployment spike that would again 
threaten social stability. 
4. Proposal B: Further Diversify SOEs into Larger Conglomerates 
The second possible solution is to diversify the SOEs. The most common motive for corporate 
diversification is that it could reduce firm risk, thus helping to improve firm value. Diversified 
companies are safer and more adaptable to the fast changing business conditions.
325
 
While diversification has been feverishly pursued by Chinese companies, some analysis shows 
that diversification indeed facilitates the quick expansion of scale, but there is no proven 
evidence that it enhances firm value in China.
326
 To a certain extent, according to Liu, evidence 
even suggests that diversification is detrimental to a firm's value creation. The analysis shows 
diversification is not associated with enhanced return on invested capital (ROIC) and 
diversification would only create bloated behemoths, whose ROIC cannot cover cost of capital, 
giving rise to conglomerate discount.
327
 
Liu studied all of the Chinese listed companies (excluding financial and utilities firms) from 
2004 to 2010. He examined how these firms’ ROICs related to the number of business segments 
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they boasted (a measure of diversification). Figure 8 presents the results of his analysis. 
Specifically, Liu classified the Chinese listed companies into five categories, based on the 
number of business segments these firms had developed over time. Group 1 represents the 
companies that focus on one product or service; Group 2 refers to the listed companies with two 
major business segments; Group 3 consists of the listed companies with three major segments, 
and so on. Group 5 deserves a few more words — it comprises the listed companies with five or 
more business segments. For each group, Liu computed the firm’s average ROIC in the current 
year (year t), and in the next year (year t + 1). 
 
Figure 8. ROIC and the number of business segments
328
 
Figure 8 shows the results. When the number of business segments increases, the Chinese listed 
companies’ ROIC does not increase accordingly. In fact, ROIC declines steadily with the 
increase of the degree of diversification. When Liu extended the analysis to the relationship 
between the number of segments and firms’ ROIC in year t + 1, Liu found the same results. For a 
specialized form, that is, a firm with only one business segment, its ROIC averaged at 3.3 
percent during the period from 2004 to 2010. When the number of business segments increased 
to five or more, these firms’ average ROIC dropped to 2.4 percent. Diversification leads to 
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bloated corporate dinosaurs, but not high-performing conglomerates in the universe of Chinese 
companies. Liu’s analysis above shows that diversification indeed facilitates the quick expansion 
of scale, but there is no proven evidence that it enhances firm value. 
After examining the two possible solutions for China’s current dilemma, it is important to 
consider the existing institutions and historic elements in order to implement the effective 
policies to produce the desirable result. Given the current economic circumstance and the failed 
cases, China likely cannot imitate the economic successes of Japan and Korea to connect SOEs 
with market economy and successfully achieve the growth. 
Although SOEs lack effective corporate governance mechanisms to discipline their managers 
and mitigate potential agency problems, the government as a regulator of SOEs is pressured with 
the responsibility of social contract with the public, and they have to serve their best interests in 
terms of maintaining the social order. This, to a certain extent ROIC-driven strategy is not the 
SOEs’ goal.329 Since laying off large numbers of workers caused social and political instability, 
the reform for SOEs should avoid the sensitive issues of selling state firms or closing them and 
dismissing their employees. In addition, the evidences has also shown that the innovative-driven 
and firm-diversification strategy cannot necessarily generate SOEs’ firm value. Moreover, 
despite that China’s former GDP growth model was quite similar to JTK’s (Japan, Taiwan and 
Korea) pre-democracy development model - a strategy of having a high savings, high 
investment, political centralization as well as high external competitiveness
330
- China’s current 
political economic structure still has the remains of its previous centrally-planned economy, 
which cannot allow its economy to further imitate JTK modern democratic model. China has to 
                                                 
329
 Grout, P.A., & Stevens, M. (2003). The Assessment: Financing and Managing Public Services. Oxford Review of 
Economic Policy, 19. 215-234. 
330 
Boltho A., Weber M. (2009), ‘Did China Follow the East Asian Development Model?,’ European Journal of 
Comparative Economics, 2, 267-286.
 
70 
 
 
 
find its own and unique solution to fit its current economic stagnation, if it wants to reach a high 
income level using decentralized economic experimentation in novel institutions and forms of 
organization.
331
  
Finally, the Belt and Road Initiative appears to be the only solution to help SOEs to decrease the 
drag on domestic growth as well as reinforce their state ownership as a pillar of domestic 
stability.  BRI at least might shore up China's economy against the potential drop in demand 
from Europe or the US for Chinese exports.
332
  Since the slowdown in China is a well-known 
fact (old news), the single biggest challenge for China now is how to manage its slowdown and 
maintain long-term social stability. The Chinese government has to be obsessed with economic 
and political stability and taking a slow, gradual approach to policy reform. Major change to the 
SOE sector is unlikely in the short term, particularly because the significant size of SOEs which 
accounts for an estimated 30-40 percent of total industrial output and 20 percent of total 
employment in urban areas.
333
  
The reality of making sweeping changes to China’s SOEs, plus the Chinese government’s 
stability-first attitude to policy changes, means that SOEs’ structural reform will remain 
consistent for a long time coming.
334  
BRI as a moderate economic transition tool can help China maintain large employment overseas 
to increase influence abroad and maintain social stability at home. BRI demands China exports a 
large proportion of the domestic workforce, which could afford the CCP (Communist Party of 
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China) opportunity to refocus domestic economic conditions and implement long-run modern 
industrial system reforms absent their preoccupation with labor layoffs and resulting unrest. This 
should include reforms to empower the private sector to stimulate and control innovation (patent 
management), upgrade to higher tech manufacturing and improve education of future labor in the 
information and high-tech industries. 
Conclusion 
In Chapter One, it is argued that the recent downturn in China’s economic growth is partially 
related to SOEs inefficient framework. The main reason for this is that SOEs cannot be sustained 
to create any economic growth within their current investment-driven and capital-intensive 
strategy.  
In Chapter Two, consideration was given to whether SOEs are able to maintain their current 
strategy to achieve new economic growth via the Belt and Road Initiative. By looking at the 
possible SOEs’ strategic rationales, risks and challenges in BRI, it is predicted to be very 
difficult for SOEs to achieve long-term profits in BRI. 
The last chapter provides a basis to explain the theory behind of SOEs’ engagement in BRI and 
that SOEs’ participation in BRI might be still worth the cost for the future of the Chinese 
economy although evidence also shows that SOEs might not be completely successful. First, the 
reform of SOEs into a more high-tech intensive model can be a very long term process and the 
current institutional system cannot “plan” the SOEs to be a more knowledge-intensive industry 
in a short term to achieve new growth. Second, the government might be reluctant to have a 
structural change reduce a significant portion of SOEs by encouraging them to layoff redundant 
workers, as it worries about unemployment and social instability. 
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The BRI appears to be the only way for SOEs to decrease the drag on domestic growth while 
trying to increase overseas demand in BRI. This initiative can help China maintain large 
employment to find new economic growth in overseas while approach a social stability in home. 
 
 
 
  
73 
 
 
 
Bibliography 
Agricultural Bank of China, Annual Report 2014. 2015. Accessed November 21, 2017. 
http://www.abchina.com/en/AboutUs/annualreport/201603/P020160405603491905726.pdf 
 
Aiyar, S., Duval, R., Puy, D., Wu, Y., & Zhang, L “Growth Slowdowns and the Middle Income 
Trap.” IMF Working Paper. 
 
Arie Y. Lewin, Martin Kenney, and Johann Peter Murmann. “China's Innovation Challenge: 
Overcoming the Middle-income Trap” (Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge 
University Press, 2016), Introduction. 
 
Amadeo, Kimberly. “China's Economy Facts and Effect on the U.S. Economy.” The Balance. 
Last modified October 26, 2017. Accessed November 22, 2017. 
https://www.thebalance.com/china-economy-facts-effect-on-us-economy-3306345. 
 
Amighini, Alessia. China's Belt and Road: A Game Changer? Milano: ISPI, 2017. 
 
Anonymous post to World Economic Forum, "8 things you need to know about China’s 
economy," June 23, 2016. Accessed November 22, 2017. 
 
“Asia Cement Corp (1102.TW).” Reuters. Accessed November 22, 2017. 
 
Atsmon, Yuval, and Max Magni. "Meet the Chinese consumer of 2020." McKinsey & Company. 
Last modified March 2012. Accessed November 22, 2017. 
https://www.mckinsey.com/global-themes/asia-pacific/meet-the-chinese-consumer-of-
2020. 
 
Aziz, Jahangir, and Cui Li. "Explaining China’s Low Consumption: The Neglected Role of 
Household Income." 2007 International Monetary Fund 07, no. 181 (July 2007). 
 
Bank, Asian Development. Promoting Logistics Development in Rural Areas. Place of 
publication not identified: Lightning Source, 2017. 
 
Beddow, Rachel, ed. Corruption Perceptions Index 2015. N.p.: Transparency International, 
2016. 
 
Blinder, Alan S. "The concise encyclopedia of economics, Keynesian Economics." Library 
Economics Liberty. Accessed November 22, 2017. 
http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/KeynesianEconomics.html. 
 
Bradsher, Keith, and Karl Russell. "Building Trade Walls." New York Times. Last modified 
March 7, 2017. Accessed November 22, 2017. 
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/business/trade-china-protectionism.html. 
 
74 
 
 
 
Bridging the Infrastructure Gap: Global Integration and the 'Belt and Road' Initiative: The 
Second Global Infrastructure Conference Report. Oxford: School of Geography and the 
Environment, 2017. 
 
Bauer, P.W. "Decomposing TFP Growth in the Presence of Cost Inefficiency, Nonconstant 
Returns to Scale, and Technological Progress?" Journal of Productivity Analysis, no. 1, 
287–299,1990 
 
Boltho A., Weber M. (2009), ‘Did China Follow the East Asian Development Model?’, 
European Journal of Comparative Economics, 2, 267-286 
 
Buckley, Chris, and Keith Bradsher. "Xi Jinping’s Marathon Speech: Five Takeaways." The New 
York Times, October 18, 2017. https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/18/world/asia/china-xi-
jinping-party-congress.html. 
 Biliang Hu and Jian Zhuang. "Knowledge Work on Excess Capacity in the People’s Republic of 
China." Asian Development Bank, July 2015, 9 
 
Bank of International Settlements, “Credit to the Non-Financial Sector,” September 18, 2016. 
 
China's overcapacity crisis can spur growth through overseas expansion," last modified January 
7, 2014 
 
China Iron and Steel Association via CEIC database. "Chinese Steel Makers Suffer Heaviest 
Loss in 2015." April 7, 2016.  
 
Callaghan, Mike, and Paul Hubbard. "The Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank: Multilateralism 
on the Silk Road." China Economic Journal 9, no. 2 (2016): 116-39. 
 
"Cheap Labor Industries in China and the End of Cheap Labor in China." facts and details. 
Accessed November 22, 2017. http://factsanddetails.com/china/cat9/sub61/item359.html. 
 
Challaney, Brahma. "China’s Debt-Trap Diplomacy." Project Syndicate, January 23, 2017. 
https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/china-one-belt-one-road-loans-debt-by-
brahma-chellaney-2017-01?barrier=accessreg. 
 
"China’s Debt-Trap Diplomacy." Project Syndicate, January 23, 2017. https://www.project-
syndicate.org/commentary/china-one-belt-one-road-loans-debt-by-brahma-chellaney-2017-
01?barrier=accessreg. 
 
Chhibber, Ajay. "China’s One Belt One Road Strategy: The New Financial Institutions and 
India’s Options." Cross-listed with the National Institute of Public Finance and Policy, 
New Delhi), March 2017. 
 
Chin, Helen, and Winnie He. "The Belt and Road Initiative: 65 Countries and Beyond." Fung 
Business Intelligence Centre, May 2016, 1-16. 
 
75 
 
 
 
"The Belt and Road Initiative: 65 Countries and Beyond." Global Sourcing Fung Business 
Intelligence Centre, May 2016, 1-9. 
 
"China Cement Industry Report 2017 - Research and Markets." Cision PR News Wire. Last 
modified June 19, 2017. Accessed November 22, 2017. 
https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/china-cement-industry-report-2017---research-
and-markets-300475711.html. 
 
China Construction Bank, Annual Report 2015. 2016. Accessed November 21, 2017. 
http://www.ccb.com/en/newinvestor/upload/20160513_1463122653/201605131457214698
92.pdf. 
 
"China hikes tax on imported luxury cars." CNBC News. Last modified December 1, 2016. 
Accessed November 22, 2017. https://www.cnbc.com/2016/12/01/china-hikes-tax-on-
imported-luxury-cars.html. 
 
"China's debt probelm." Reuter graphics. Accessed December 8, 2017. 
http://fingfx.thomsonreuters.com/gfx/rngs/CHINA-DEBT-GRAPHIC/0100315H2LG/. 
 
"China's Export Led Growth Model Wasn't Always So Export Led." Center For economic and 
Policy Research. Last modified July 16, 2013. 
http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2011/02/27/chinas-export-led-growth-model. 
 
"China's overcapacity crisis can spur growth through overseas expansion." Last modified January 
7, 2014. http://www.scmp.com/comment/insight-opinion/article/1399681/chinas-
overcapacity-crisis-can-spur-growth-through-overseas. 
 
Comin, Diego  "China's textile exports decline in 2015." China Daily. Second 
Edition,eds.    Steven N. Durlauf and Lawrence E. Blume, Palgrave Macmillan. Last 
modified January 14, 2008 
 
"China Steel Corp (OTCPK:CISEY) ROIC %: 2.82% (As of Sep. 2017)." 
https://www.gurufocus.com/term/ROIC/CISEY/ROIC-/China-Steel-Corp. Last modified 
September 9, 2017. https://www.gurufocus.com/term/ROIC/CISEY/ROIC-/China-Steel-
Corp. 
 
China 2030: Building a Modern, Harmonious, and Creative Society. Washington, DC: World 
Bank, 2013. 
 
 China’s innovation challenge: "overcoming the middle-income trap / edited by Arie Y. Lewin, 
Martin Kenney, Johann Peter Murmann. Cambridge, United Kingdom : Cambridge 
University Press, 2016. LCCN 2015047143 | ISBN 9781107127128 (hardback ) 
            Du, Y., Park, A., and Wang, S. 2005. Migration and rural poverty in China. 
China 2030, "Building a Modern, Harmonious, and Creative Society." (Washington, DC: 
World  Bank, 2013) 
76 
 
 
 
Carsten A. Holz, "The impact of competition and labor remuneration on profitability in China’s 
industrial state-owned enterprises." Journal of Contemporary China, 11, 515– 538,518. 
 
China - 7-State Owned Enterprises." export.gov. Last modified July 25, 2017. Accessed 
December 3, 2017. https://www.export.gov/article?id=China-State-Owned-Enterprises. 
 
Clarke, Michael, Andrew Small, and Sebastien Peyrouse. "China’s Belt and Road Initiative: 
Views from along the Silk Road." The National Bureau of Asian Research, Seattle, 
Washington, no. 24 (July 2017): 65-122. 
Chris Buckley and Keith Bradsher, "Xi Jinping’s Marathon Speech: Five Takeaways," The New 
York Times, October 18, 2017, 158  
 
Clements, Benedict, Rina Bhattacharya, and Toan Quoc Nguyen. "External Debt, Public 
Investment, and Growth in Low-Income Countries." IMF Working Paper, 2003, 1-24. 
 
Corporate Social Responsibility Report of Bank of China Limited for 2015. March 2016. 
Accessed November 21, 2017. 
http://pic.bankofchina.com/bocappd/report/201603/P020160330625462244574.pdf. 
 
Couture, Victor, Benjamin Faber, Yizhen Gu, and Lizhi Liu. "E-Commerce Integration and 
Economic Development: Evidence from China." The Clausen Center, The Haas School of 
Business, July 2017, 1-29. 
Craig Charney and Shehzad Qazi, "Corruption in China: What Companies Need to Know." 
Charney Research, January 15, 2015. 
 
  Chen Xiangyang,"A Snapshot of External Security Risks of Building ‘One Belt, One Road [绸 
缪“一带一路建设外部安全风险],’” Liaowang [瞭望], April 14, 2014. Fu and Lou 
similarly argue that political strife, economic challenges, and “security chaos” in 
Afghanistan and Pakistan are difficult to address in the near term. Fu and Lou, “Some 
Thoughts on Building the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road,” 6 
 
Cowen, Tyler. "A simple primer for understanding China’s downturn." Marginal Revolution, 
September 2, 2015. 
 
China's Innovation Challenge: Overcoming the Middle-income Trap. Cambridge, United 
Kingdom: Cambridge University Press, 2016. 
 
 Cardiff Garcia. "China and traditional industrialisation-led development:  The Economic 
Journal, January 22, 2016 
 
 DBS Group Research. "Enduring themes in global economic mythology." The Development 
Bank of Singapore, August 24, 2017 
 
Dong, Luan. "Capping Coal Consumption and Reduce Carbon Emissions in China’s Industrial 
Secto." Working Paper, May 27, 2015. 
 
77 
 
 
 
Du, Julan, and Yifei Zhang. "Does One Belt One Road initiative promote Chinese overseas 
direct investment??." China Economic Review, May 10, 2017. 
 
Dung, Phuong, trans. "Vietnam Import-Export Report 2016 released." HANITIMES. Last 
modified March 30, 2017. Accessed December 6, 2017. 
http://hanoitimes.com.vn/investment/news/2017/03/81e0b089/vietnam-import-export-
report-2016-released/. 
 
David Lipton, "Rebalancing China: International Lessons in Corporate Debt." International 
Monetary Fund, June 2016. 
 
European Chamber of Commerce in China. "Overcapacity in China: An Impediment to the 
Party’s Reform Agenda,’’ February 2016, 14. 
 
Ejigayehu, Dereje Abera. "The Effect of External Debt On Economic growth." Södertörns 
högskola | Department of economics, 2013, 1-50. 
 
Eloot, Karel, Alan Huang, and Martin Lehnich. "A new era for manufacturing in China." 
McKinsey&Company Operation. Last modified June 2013. Accessed November 22, 2017. 
https://www.mckinsey.com/business-functions/operations/our-insights/a-new-era-for-
manufacturing-in-china. 
 
Eurasian Economic Integration. Saint Petersburg, Russia: Eurasian Development Bank, 2017, 
2017. 
 
"The end of cheap Chinese labour?" The Economist. Last modified July 18, 2010. Accessed 
November 22, 2017. https://www.economist.com/blogs/freeexchange/2010/07/china. 
 
"Eurasian-stability-depends-on-kazakhstans-politicaltransition." East Asia Forum, February 23, 
2017. http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2017/02/23/eurasias-stability-depends-on-
kazakhstans-politicaltransition/. 
 
Fan, J.P.H., Huang, J., Oberholzer-Gee, F., Smith, T.D., Zhao, M., 2008. Diversification of 
Chinese companies: an international comparison. Chin. Manag. Stud. 2 (1), 6–13. 
 
Grout, P.A., & Stevens, M. (2003). The Assessment: Financing and Managing Public Services. 
Oxford Review of Economic Policy, 19. 215-234. 
 
Frolovskiy, Dmitriy. "Kazakhstan's China Choice." The Diplomat, June 6, 2016. 
https://thediplomat.com/2016/07/kazakhstans-china-choice/. 
 
Fu Mengzi and Xu Gang, “‘One Belt, One Road’: Progress, Challenges, and Responses [一带一
路’: 进展, 挑战与应对],” China International Studies [国际问题研究], no. 3 (2017). 
 
Fred Kleiterp and Clarence Wong, "China’s Belt & Road Initiative: the impact on commercial 
insurance in participating regions" Swiss Re Institute, March 2017, 3. 
78 
 
 
 
 
Fu and Lou, “Some Thoughts on Building the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road,” 6. The incident 
involved firing of shells from both sides, resulting in a reported five Indian and four 
Pakistani civilian casualties. “Kashmir: Nine Civilians Killed in India-Pakistan Border 
Firing,” BBC, October 6, 2014 
Gang, Wu. "SOEs Lead Infrastructure Push in 1,700 ‘Belt and Road’ Projects." Caixin, May 9, 
2017. 
 
Guanghua NY Forum. The Future of Corporate China, 2017 video file, posted Jun 
28,2017   accessed, Nov 19,2017, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=edV78OWIgaI 
. 
Geng, Lixin. "Sino-Myanmar Relations: Analysis and Prospects." The Culture Mandala 7, no. 2 
(December 2006). 
 
Guoziwei ‘modi’ zhongyang jingwai zichan. " [SASAC “Feels Bottom” on Central State-Owned 
Enterprises’ Overseas Assets], Xinhua News, March 18, 2015 
 
Gabriel Wildau. "China’s State Owned Zombie Economy." International Monetary Fund, 
February 29, 2016. 
 
"3-13 Gross Domestic Product by Expenditure Approch." China Statistical Yearbook. Last 
modified March 2017. http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/ndsj/2016/indexeh.htm. 
 
 Garret, Geoffrey. 2004. “Globalization’s Missing Middle.” Foreign Affairs 83: 84-96.  
 
Glenn, Elias, and Sue-Lin Wong. "China posts worst export fall since 2009 as fears of U.S. trade 
war loom." Reuters. Last modified January 13, 2017. Accessed November 22, 2017. 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-economy-trade/china-posts-worst-export-fall-
since-2009-as-fears-of-u-s-trade-war-loom-idUSKBN14X0FD. 
 
Global Terrorism Index 2017. N.p.: Institute for Economics & Peace, 2017. 
 
"Globle Steel Trade Monitor." International Trade Administration, August 2017. Accessed 
November 22, 2017. https://www.trade.gov/steel/countries/pdfs/exports-china.pdf. 
 
He, Xinhua, and Quo Qin. "Aggregate Investment in People’s Republic of China: Some 
Empirical Evidence." Asian Development Review, vol. 21 21, no. 1 (2004): 99-117. 
 
Heckman, James J. "China’s Investment in Human Capital." National Bureau of Economic 
Research, no. 9296 (October 2002). 
 
Hofman, Bert. "China’s One Belt One Road Initiative: What we know thus far." The World 
Bank, December 4, 2015. http://blogs.worldbank.org/eastasiapacific/china-one-belt-one-
road-initiative-what-we-know-thus-far. 
 
79 
 
 
 
"https://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21728640-investors-have-been-cheered-sweeping-
cutbacks-they-should-look-more-closely-making-sense." The Economist. Last modified 
September 9, 2017. Accessed December 10, 2017. http://Making sense of capacity cuts in 
China. 
 
Huang, Zheping. "Your guide to understanding OBOR, China’s new Silk Road plan." QUATZ, 
May 15, 2017. Accessed January 12, 2018. https://qz.com/983460/obor-an-extremely-
simple-guide-to-understanding-chinas-one-belt-one-road-forum-for-its-new-silk-road/. 
Huang, Y. "Selling China: Foreign Direct Investment During the Reform Era." Cambridge, 
UK:  Cambridge University Press 
 
ICBC Corporate Social Responsibility Report 2015. March 31, 2016. Accessed November 21, 
2017. 
http://v.icbc.com.cn/userfiles/Resources/ICBCLTD/download/2016/2015_corporate_social
_responsibility_report_en.pdf. 
 
"Infrastructure in China: Foundation for Growth." KPMG. 
 
Industrial Cooperation between Countries along the Belt and Road (《“一帶一路”沿線國家產
業合作報告》), China International Trade Institute, August 2015 
Jie, Meng, ed. "Economic Watch: China's SOEs move ahead on market reform." Xinhua News. 
Last modified July 26, 2017. Accessed November 22, 2017. 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2017-07/26/c_136474847.htm. 
 
James Kynge. "Corporate Credit Shock Beckons for China. Financial Times, January 26, 2016. 
 
Jakob, "Performance in Strategic Sectors: A Comparison of Profitability and Efficiency of State-
Owned Enterprises and Private Corporations. The Park Place Economist, 25(1), 8. 
 
Jingji yu guanli yanjiu (Economics and management research), January 1998; (2) Liu Yong, Di 
sanci shiye gaofeng (The third peak in unemployment), p. 95; (3) 1998-nian1: Zhongguo 
shehui yu yuce (1998 analysis and predictions of Chinese society) (Bei-jing: 
ShehuikexueW enxian Chubanshe, 1998); 
 
Jiang Xueqing. "Regulators Tighten Bank Risk Management, Warn on Asset Bubbles." China 
Daily, July 8, 2016. 
 
Jie, Yu. "China’s One Belt, One Road: A Reality Check." !deas, July 2017, 1-11. 
 
Jinghai Zheng, Jinghai, Arne Bigsten, and Angang Hu. "Can China’s Growth be Sustained? A 
Productivity Perspective." World Development 37, no. 4 (08 7, 2008): 874-88. 
 
Johnson, Christopher K. "President Xi Jinping's ''Belt and Road' Initiative, A Practical 
assessment of the Chinese Communist Party's Roadmap for China's Global Resurgence." 
Center for Strategic & International Studies, March 2016, 1-24. 
80 
 
 
 
 
Jeffrey Hays. "Cheap labor industries in China and the end of Cheap Labor In China." accessed 
November 22, 2017. 
 
"President Xi Jinping's 'Belt and Road' Initiative-A practical Assessment of the Chinese 
Communist Party's Roadmap for China's Global Resurgence." A Report of the CSIS 
Freeman Chair in China Studies, March 2016, 1-25. 
 
Kang, Joong Shik, and Wei Liao. "Chinese Imports: What’s Behind the Slowdown?" IMF 
Working Paper, May 2016. 
 
Keynes, John Maynard. A Tract on monetary Reform. London: Macmillan and Co, Limited, 
1924. 
 
Kleiterp, Fred, and Clarence Clarence Wong. "China’s Belt & Road Initiative: the impact on 
commercial insurance in participating regions." Swiss Re Institute, March 2017. 
 
Kleiterp, Fred, and Clarence Wong. "China’s Belt & Road Initiative: the impact on commercial 
insurance in participating regions." Swiss Re Institute, March 2017, 1-36. 
 
Kong, Yu, John L. Glascock, and Ran Lu-Andrews. "An Investigation into Real Estate 
Investment and Economic Growth in China: A Dynamic Panel Data Approach." 
sustainability, MDPI, January 15, 2016. 
 
Krugman, Paul. "The Myth of Asia's Miracle." Foreign Affairs 73, no. 6 (November/December 
1994). 
 
Krugman, Paul. "Keynes, Keynesians, the Long Run, and Fiscal Policy." New York Times, May 
4, 2013. Accessed November 22, 2017. 
https://krugman.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/05/04/keynes-keynesians-the-long-run-and-fiscal-
policy/. 
 
Keefer, Philip and Stephen Knack," Boondoggles, Rent-Seeking, and Political Checks and 
Balances: Public Investment under Unaccountable Governments, The Review of 
Economics and Statistics, Vol. 89. 2007. 
 
Kuijs, Louis. "Investment and Saving in China." The World Bank Office, Beijing, China East 
Asia Pacific Poverty Reduction and Economic Management (EASPR), June 3, 2005. 
 
Lewin, Arie Y., Martin Kenney, and Johann Peter Murmann. China's Innovation Challenge: 
Overcoming the Middle-income Trap. Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University 
Press, 2016. 
 L I Yongyou, PEI Yu. "Public Expenditure and National Output: An Empirical Analysis Based 
on Wagner's Law."  Journal of Finance and Economics, Vol. 131 No.17 (July 2017) 
 
81 
 
 
 
Lardy, Nicholas, "Financial Repression in China." Peterson Institute for International 
Economics. Policy Brief. September 2008.  
 
Li, Linyue, Thomas D. Willett, and Nan Zhang. "The Effects of the Global Financial Crisis on 
China’s Financial Market and Macroeconomy." Hindawi Publishing Corporation 
Economics Research International 2012 (December 11, 2011). 
 
Liu Guanchao. "Causes of Inadequate Consumption in China: a Literature Review,." Modern 
Economic Science; Vol. 32 No. 6(Nov. 2010) 
 
Li, Shaomin, Yingchou Lin, and David D. Selover. "Chinese State-owned Enterprises: Are They 
Inefficient?" The Chinese Economy 47, nos. 5-6 (November/December 2014): 81-115. 
 
Li, Yuan. "China's Belt and Road: A Game Changer? "China's Belt and Road: A Game 
Changer? , 13-33. 
 
Library of Eurasian Integration "Eurasian Economic Integration: Facts and Figures." Eurasian 
Economic Commission, 2012, 1-74. 
Lin, J.Y., & Z. Li, " Policy Burden, Privatization and Soft Budget Constraint. "Journal of 
Comparative Economics, 36 (1), 90-102. p. 128 
 
Lin, S., and W. Rowe. 2006. “Determinants of the Profitability of China’s Regional 
SOEs.”China Economic Review 17, no. 2: 120–41. 
 
Lin, J.Y., & Z. Li. Policy Burden, Privatization and Soft Budget Constraint. Journal of 
Comparative Economics, 36 (1), 90-102.p.128 Lin, S., and W. Rowe. 2006. “Determinants 
of the Profitability of China’s Regional SOEs.”China Economic Review 17, no. 2: 120–
41.2008 
 
 Lin, S., and W. Rowe,"Determinants of the Profitability of China’s Regional SOEs.” China 
Economic Review 17, no. 2: 120–141,128 
 
L. Wong, and K. Ngok, “Social Policy between Plan and Market: xiagang (Off-duty 
Employment) and the Policy of the Re-employment Service Centres in China,” Social 
Policy and Administration 40 (2006): 158-173. 
 
Lin, J.Y., & Z. Li. “Policy Burden, Privatization and Soft Budget Constraint.” Journal of 
Comparative Economics, 36 (1), 90-102. Lin, S., and W. Rowe. 2006. “Determinants of the 
Profitability of China’s Regional SOEs.”China Economic Review 17, no. 2: 120–41, 128, 
2008 
 
Liu, Miao. "China’s cancelled Burma railway is its latest derailment in southeast Asia." Quartz, 
July 25, 2014. Accessed February 4, 2018. 
 
Liu, Qiao. Corporate China 2.0: The Great Shakeup. New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016. 
 
82 
 
 
 
Corporate China 2.0: The Great Shakeup. New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016. 
 
"Does ROIC Apply to Corporate China?" Springer Link. Last modified December 25, 2016. 
Accessed November 22, 2017. https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1057/978-1-137-55089-
7_3#citeas. 
 
Lu, Zhiyao. "China's Excess Capacity in Steel: A Fresh Look." China Economic Watch. Last 
modified June 29, 2017. Accessed November 22, 2017. https://piie.com/blogs/china-
economic-watch/chinas-excess-capacity-steel-fresh-look. 
 
Lin, J. and Treichel, V.. "Learning from China’s Rise to Escape the Middle-Income Trap." A 
new structural economics approach to Latin America. Policy Research Working Paper, No. 
6165. Washington, DC: World Bank. 1 
 
Lardy, Nicholas. "Financial Repression in China."  Peterson Institute for International 
Economics, Policy Brief. September 2008.  
 
Magnier, Mark. "As Growth Slows, China Highlights Transition From Manufacturing to 
Service." Wall Street Journal, January 19, 2016. Accessed November 22, 2017. 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/as-growth-slows-china-highlights-transition-from-
manufacturing-to-service-1453221751."China’s Productivity Problem Drags on Growth." 
The Wall Street Journal. Last modified September 1, 2014. Accessed December 3, 2017. 
https://blogs.wsj.com/economics/2014/09/01/chinas-productivity-problem-drags-on-
growth/. 
 
"Making sense of capacity cuts in China." Economist. Accessed September 9, 2017. 
https://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21728640-investors-have-been-cheered-
sweeping-cutbacks-they-should-look-more-closely-making-sense 
 
Mathieu Duchâtel, Oliver Brauner, and Zhou Hong. " Protecting China’s Overseas Interests 
(Stockholm: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute I, 2014), 41.Lin Limin, 
“Advancing ‘One Belt, One Road,’ Highlight the Focus [推进’一带一路’, 要突出 重点],” 
World Affairs [世界知识], no. 21 (2016), 66 
 
Morrison, W. M. "China’s economic rise: history, trends, challenges, and implications for the 
United States. CRS Report RL 33534. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 
47,2015. 
Mark Magnier. "IMF Warns China of Risks of Mounting Corporate Debt." Wall Street Journal, 
June 12, 2016. 
 
Mo,Rong (2002), Jiuye Xingshi Yiran Yanjun (Employment Still Troubling). In Ru Xin, Lu 
Xueyi and Li Peilin (eds), 2002. (The Year 2002: Analysis and Forecast of Social 
Conditions in China), Beijing Social Sciences Documentation Publishing House, 165-174 
 
Ma, Guonan, et al. “China’s high saving rate: myth and reality.” Bank of International 
Settlements Working Papers. #312. 2010. 
83 
 
 
 
 
Naughton, Barry. The Chinese Economy: Transitions and Growth. Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 
2007. 
 
Neutrality, Wallace, and Ricardian Neutrality. "Confessions of a Supply-Side Liberal." 
Confessions of a Supply-Side Liberal, June 21, 2012. Accessed November 22, 2017. 
https://blog.supplysideliberal.com/post/25592568339/wallace-neutrality-and-ricardian-
neutrality. 
 
Nkpubre, Arit Edet. "Exploring the Nexus Between External Debt Management and Economic 
Growth." Arit Edet-Nkpubre, Int. J. Eco 412:43-65. 
 
North, Martin. "Assessing China’s Residential Real Estate Market." Digital Finance Analytics 
Blog. Last modified November 17, 2017. Accessed December 6, 2017. 
http://www.digitalfinanceanalytics.com/blog/assessing-chinas-residential-real-estate-
market/. 
 
O’Neill, Daniel C. "One Belt, One Road, One Regime Type: The Limits of Chinese Influence in 
Developing States." University of the Pacific School of International Studies, ISA 
International Conference 2017 Hong Kong, June 5, 2017, 1-32. 
 
OECD Science, Technology and Industry Outlook 2008 – ISBN 978-92-64-04991-8 – © OECD 
2008, https://www.oecd.org/sti/inno/41559747.pdf 
 
P., L. "Autocracy or democracy?" Economist, March 27, 2013. 
 
Perlez, Jane, and Yufan Huang. "Behind China’s $1 Trillion Plan to Shake Up the Economic 
Order." The New York Times, May 13, 2017. 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/13/business/china-railway-one-belt-one-road-1-trillion-
plan.html. 
 
Prasad, Eswar. "maintaining the low cost of production also contributed to the rise in the 
disposable incomes of enterprises might be the only way to stay in profitability." 
Brookings. Last modified April 22, 2015. Accessed November 22, 2017. 
https://www.brookings.edu/testimonies/the-path-to-sustainable-growth-in-china/. 
 
Presbitero, Andrea F, "Too much and too fast? Public investment scaling-up and absorptive 
capacity." Journal of Development Economics (2016): 17-31. 
doi:10.1016/j.jdeveco.2015.12.005. 
 
Perkins D.H., Rawski T.G. (2008), ‘Forecasting China’s Economic Growth to 2025’, in Brandt 
and Rawski (eds.) (2008) 
Qiao Liu. "Does ROIC Apply to Corporate China?."  Springer Link, last modified December 25, 
2016. 
 
84 
 
 
 
Qiao Jian, Xinyilun Jiegou Tiaozheng Xiade Laodong Guanxi (Labour relations under the new 
wave of structural adjustment). In Ru Xin, Lu Xueyi and Li Peilin (eds) (), Analysis and 
Forecast on China’s Social Development, Beijing: Social Sciences Documentation 
Publishing House 
 
"The path to sustainable growth in China." Brookings. Last modified April 22, 2015. Accessed 
December 9, 2017. https://www.brookings.edu/testimonies/the-path-to-sustainable-growth-
in-china/. 
 
Radygin, Alexander, Yury Yury Simachev, and Revold Entov. "The state-owned company: 
“State failure” or “market failure”?" Russian Journal of Economics, 2015, 55-80. 
 
Razmi, Arslan. "Is the Chinese Investment- and Export-Led Growth Model Sustainable? Some 
Rising Concerns." Department of Economics – University of Massachusetts, Amherst, 
2008. 
 
Report on the Implementation of the 2014 Plan for the National Economic and Social 
Development and on the 2015 Draft Plan for National Economic and Social Development. 
National Development and Reform Commission. Beijing, China: Delivered at the Fourth 
Session of the Twelfth National People's Congress, 2015. 
 
Rizzo, Mario. "In the long run, we are all dead': What did Keynes really mean?" The Christian 
Science Monitor, June 28, 2010. Accessed November 22, 2017. 
https://www.csmonitor.com/Business/ThinkMarkets/2010/0628/In-the-long-run-we-are-all-
dead-What-did-Keynes-really-mean. 
 
Robert, Dexter. "Pollution, Risk Are Downside of China's 'Blind Expansion.'" Bloomberg 
Buslness Wekk. Last modified March 5, 2013. Accessed November 22, 2017. 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2013-03-05/pollution-risk-are-downside-of-
chinas-blind-expansion. 
 
Schuman, Michael. "China Has World's Biggest Productivity Problem And solving it will require 
opening up." Bloomberg View. Last modified May 11, 2017. Accessed December 8, 2017. 
http://CHEN Quanrun YANG Cuihong,” The Impact of Expanding Household 
Consumption on the GDP of China,” J.Sys.Sci.?Math.Scis; 31(2),206—215 (2011,2). 
 
Sheehan, Spencer. "How to Reform China’s SOEs." The Diplomatic, June 7, 2017. 
 
Shi Xiehong, "The Influence of Central Asian Religious Extremists on ‘One Belt, One Road’ 
Construction and China’s Response [中亚宗教极端势力对’一带一路’建设的影响及 我
国的应对],” World Religious Cultures [世界宗教文化), no. 2 (2016], 16–17. Shi is a 
postdoctoral researcher in the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS) National 
Institute of International Strategy. 
 
Sherraden, Samuel. "The Main Cause of China’s High Savings: Income Suppression for High 
Investment." New America. Last modified March 21, 2011. Accessed November 22, 2017. 
85 
 
 
 
https://www.newamerica.org/economic-growth/blog/the-main-cause-of-chinas-high-
savings-income-suppression-for-high-investment/. 
 
Sicular, Terry, Ximing Yue, Björn Gustafsson, and Shi Li. "The Urban-Rural Income Gap and 
Inequality in China." Wiley Online Library. Last modified February 28, 2007. Accessed 
December 7, 2017.  
 
SOTHEAR, KANG. "Overall Export Values Rise; Garments Slow." The Cambodia Daily. Last 
modified February 4, 2016. Accessed December 6, 2017. 
https://www.cambodiadaily.com/news/overall-export-values-rise-garments-slow-107427/ 
 
"Southeast Asia's debt problem hasn't gone away." Bloomberg, April 17, 2016. 
https://www.bloomberg.com/professional/blog/southeast-asias-debt-problem-hasnt-gone-
away/ 
 
Simeon Djankow, "The Rationale Behind China’s Belt and Road Initiative,” in China’s Belt and 
Road Initiative: Motives, Scope, and Challenges, ed. Simeon Djankov and Sean Minder." 
Peterson Institute of International Economics, Washington, DC. 2016), 7–8. 
 
Staff, Reuters, ed. "Bangladesh exports rise 12.7 pct in December on higher garment sales." 
Reuters. Last modified September 28, 2017. Accessed December 6, 2017. 
https://www.reuters.com/article/bangladesh-exports/bangladesh-exports-rise-12-7-pct-in-
december-on-higher-garment-sales-idUSL3N14P20G20160105. 
 
Sun, Peng, and Almas Heshmati. "International Trade and its Effects on Economic Growth in 
China." Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit Institute for the Study of Labor, no. 5151 
(August 2010). 
 
Sarmiza Pencea and Iulia Monica Oehler-Sincai. "Investment-led development in China – From 
past accomplishments, To future challenges." 93 
 
Swaine, Michael D. "Chinese Views and Commentary on the “One Belt, One Road” Initiative." 
Swaine, China Leadership Monitor, no. 47: 1-24. 
 
Sze, Norman, and Flora Wu. "One Belt, One Road” The Internationalization of China’s SOEs." 
Deloitte Perspective, 5-21 
Taylor, John B. "Getting Back on Track: Macroeconomic Policy Lessons from the Financial 
Crisis." Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Review, 92, no. 3 (May/June 2010): 165-76. 
Tom Mitchell and Yuan Yang. "China Rails against Global ‘Hype’ on Overcapacity." Financial 
Times, June 6, 2016 
 
This information is derived from the State Department’s Office of Investment Affairs’ 
Investment Climate Statement. Any questions on the ICS can be directed to EB-ICS-
DL@state.gov, ed. "China - 7-State Owned Enterprises." export.gov. Last modified July 
25, 2017. Accessed December 9, 2017. https://www.export.gov/article?id=China-State-
Owned-Enterprises. 
86 
 
 
 
 
Uyen, Nguyen Nguyen Dieu Tu. "Vietnam's Economic Growth Surges to Above 7% as Exports 
Climb." Bloomberg. https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-09-29/vietnam-s-
economy-expands-at-faster-pace-in-third-quarter. 
 
Vinokurov, Evgeny. "EDB Eurasian Integration Yearbook 2013." EDB Eurasian Integration 
Yearbook, 2013, 1-397. EDB Centre for Integration Studies. 
 
Wang, Jici, and Lixia Mei. "Dynamics of labour-intensive clusters in China: Relying on low 
labour costs or cultivating innovation?" International Institute for Labour Studies Geneva, 
2009. 
 
Wijeratne, David, Joshua Yau, Gabriel Wong, Mark Rathbone, Neu Boon Ling Boon Ling, and 
Stella Lau. "Repaving the ancient Silk Routes." PwC Growth Markets Centre, June 2017, 
1-70. 
 
Wilson, Jeffrey D. Wilson D. "What does China want from the Asian Infrastructure Investment 
Bank?" Indo-Pacific Insight Series 5 (May 2017): 1-11. 
 
WU, Changqi. "Implementing the “One Belt, One Road Initiative” in Economic and Trade 
Cooperation Zones." Guanghua School of Management, Peking University Guanghua, June 
30, 2017. 
Westcott, C. "Combating corruption in Southeast Asia. Manila, Philippines." Asian Development 
Bank, 2001. 
Wang Weixing. "One Belt, One Road’ Under Global Vision: Risks and Challenges [全球视野 
下的’一带一路’: 风险与挑战],” Frontiers [学术前沿], no. 5 (2015), 10 
 
Wang Weixing, "Research on the Risks and Challenges Facing the ‘One Belt, One Road’ 
Strategy and Responses [一带一路’战略面临的风险挑战及对策研究],” China 
Leadership Science [中 国领导科学], no. 8 (2015), 44. 
 
 Warner, Andrew, "Public Investment as an Engine of Growth." IMF Working Papers, no. 
148   (2014): 1. doi:10.5089/9781498378277.001,4. 
  
Wenhao Cheng,  "An empirical study of corruption within China’s state-owned enterprises,’’ 
The  China Review, Vol. 4, No. 2 (2004), pp. 55–80 
 
Wuthnow, Joel. "Chinese Perspectives on the Belt and Road Initiative: Strategic Rationales, 
Risks, and Implications." China Strategic Perspectives, 1-45. Center for the Study of 
Chinese Military Affairs Institute for National Strategic Studies National Defense 
University. 
 
Wyman, Oliver. "Navigating the New Silk Road Expert Perspectives on China’s Belt and Road 
Initiative." Marsh & McLennan Companies, Asian Pacific Risk Center, 2017, 1-35. 
87 
 
 
 
 
Wu Xianman and Jiang Zhaoyi. "TA Research on Financial Support Policy about the Structural 
Reform in the Supply Side in Wuhan." Nankai University Magazine, Vol. 5 No. 7(2016) 
 
World Bank & Development Research Center of the State Council, P. R. C. 2013. China 2030: 
Building a Modern, Harmonious, and Creative Society. Washington, DC: World Bank. 
 
Weiying Zhang. "The Road Leading to the Market” Abingdon: Routledge Taylor & Francis 
Group, 2017 
 
Wong, and K. Ngok, “Social Policy between Plan and Market: xiagang (Off-duty Employment) 
and the Policy of the Re-employment Service Centres in China,” Social Policy and 
Administration 40 (2006): 158-173. 
 
Xiang Bo. "China Construction Bank's infrastructure loans surge,." Xinhua News 23, March 27 
 
Xinhua. "China’s SOE Profits Post Milder Decline." School of Marxism of Tsinghua University, 
Economics Department of University of Massachusetts Amherst, July 2010. 
 
Xinhua, ‘‘Chinese Steel Makers Suffer Heaviest Loss in 2015,’’ April 7, 2016. 
 
Xinhua, ‘‘China’s SOE Profits Post Milder Decline,’’ July 25, 2016 
 
Xiao Geng, Xiuke Yang, and Anna Janus, "State-owned Enterprises in China, Reform Dynamics 
and Impacts”, 2009,155. 
 
Xu Yi-Chong, "Chinese State-Owned Enterprises in Africa: Ambassadors or Freebooters?" 
Journal of Contemporary China 23, no. 89 (2014): 822-840. 
 
Yang, Dennis Tao, Junsen Zhang, and Shaojie Zhou. "Why Are Saving Rates So High in 
China?" Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit Institute for the Study of Labor, no. 
5465 (January/February 2011). 
 
Yu Jie, "China’s One Belt, One Road: A Reality Check," !deas, July 2017, 3.  
 
Yu, Jing, Mickey Fang Xu, Charlene Charlene Tsang, Serena Jing Qiu, and Mark Purdy. The 
Power of Three How a new approach to labor, capital and productivity can transform 
China’s economy and businesses. Accenture ed. Beijing, China: Accenture, n.d. Accessed 
December 3, 2017. https://www.accenture.com/cn-en/_acnmedia/Accenture/cn-
en/PDF/Accenture-The-Power-of-Three.pdf. 
 
Yin Xiangru, "An Analysis Of Corruption In China: The Guanxi Network Of Chinese High 
Level Officials And Governors."  International Development, Community and Environment 
(IDCE), 2007. 140 
 
88 
 
 
 
Ye Hailin, "India’s South Asia Policy and its Influence on China Promoting ‘One Belt, One 
Road   [印度南亚政策及中国推进’一带一路’的影响],’” Indian Ocean Economic 
Research [印度洋经 济体研究], no. 2 (2016), 15. 
 
Yuan, Sophia. "Made in China' isn't so cheap anymore, and that could spell headache for 
Beijing." CNBC News. Last modified February 27, 2017. Accessed November 22, 2017. 
https://www.cnbc.com/2017/02/27/chinese-wages-rise-made-in-china-isnt-so-cheap-
anymore.html. 
 
Zhang, Dandan, Xin Li, and Jinjin Xue. "Education Inequality between Rural and Urban Areas 
of the People’s Republic of China, Migrants’ Children Education, and Some Implications." 
Asian Development Review 32, no. 01 (2015): 196-224. 
 
Zhang, Hangyan. "How to revive the manufacturing sector?" China Daily. Last modified 
December 20, 2016. Accessed November 22, 2017. 
http://usa.chinadaily.com.cn/opinion/2016-12/20/content_27716295.htm. 
 
Zhang, Simon. "China’s Rising Costs." China Business Review. Last modified July 1, 2012. 
Accessed November 22, 2017. https://www.chinabusinessreview.com/chinas-rising-costs/. 
 
Zhang, Weiying. The Road Leading to the Market. Abingdon: Routledge Taylor & Francis 
Group, 2017. 
 
Zhang, Zhuliang. "Interest Rate Policy in China: The Impact of Suppressed Deposit Rates on 
Household Income from 2000-2007." Undergraduate Economic Review 8, no. 1 (2011). 
 
Zhou, Jiayi, Karl Hallding, and Guoyi Han. "The Trouble With China's 'One Belt One Road' 
Strategy." The Diplomat. Last modified June 26, 2015. Accessed December 12, 2017. 
https://thediplomat.com/2015/06/the-trouble-with-the-chinese-marshall-plan-strategy/. 
 
Zhu, Andong, and David M. Kotz. "The Dependence of China's Economic Growth on Exports 
and Investment." School of Marxism of Tsinghua University, Economics Department 
ofUniversity of Massachusetts Amherst, July 2010. 
 
Zhu, Qing, and XiaoHu Wang. "Structural Changes of Public Expenditures in China." Journal of 
Public Budgeting, Accounting & Financial Management 23, no. 4 (Winter 2011): 569-87. 
 
Zhu, Wenqian. "China's textile exports decline in 2015." China Daily. Last modified January 14, 
2016. Accessed November 22, 2017. http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/business/2016-
01/14/content_23088319.htm. 
 
Zhu, Andong, and David M. Kotz. "The Dependence of China's Economic Growth on Exports 
and Investment." School of Marxism of Tsinghua University, Economics Department of 
University of Massachusetts Amherst, July 2010. 
 
89 
 
 
 
Zhang Jinping, "The Threats to ‘One Belt, One Road’ of the Strategic ‘Eastward Shift’ of 
International Terrorist Forces [国际恐怖势力战略 ‘东向’对’一带一路’的威胁],” in 
Assessment of China’s Peripheral Security Situation, 206. 
 
Zaijiuye gongzuode yanjiu yu shijian (Research and practice on reemployment work) (Beijing: 
Jingji Guanli Chubanshe, 1998). 52. 
 
Zhu, Andong, and David M. Kotz. "The Dependence of China's Economic Growth on Exports 
and Investment." School of Marxism of Tsinghua University, Economics Department of 
University of Massachusetts Amherst, July 2010. 
 
 
